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THESIS

POLITICAL WARFARE AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS

by

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June 2015

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POLITICAL WARFARE AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines if increased Department of Defense (DOD) involvement in political warfare (PW) is justified through a qualitative, comparative analysis of U.S. PW actions conducted by the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and DOD in two Cold War cases: Italy from 1943–1948 and Chile from 1961–1973. Concepts of strategy and social movement models of Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, and Sidney Tarrow are applied to historical PW actions, both overt and covert. The case-study analysis clarifies each agency's conduct of PW and develops analytical tools to classify PW actions by approach and impact within the political setting. Data was collected from archives, declassified government documents, and expert analyses. Results indicate that, compared to other U.S. agencies, the DOD had a limited direct role in PW in the cases studied, but was an important enabler. In applying models of social movement theory to historical analysis, this thesis identifies and develops the contentious politics mobilization model's potential use in planning and evaluating PW strategies.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPM	Contentious Politics Mobilization
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
POS	Political Opportunity Structure
PPM	Political Process Model
USIA	United States Information Agency

Italian Political Parties

DC	Christian Democrats
MSI	Italian Social Movement
PCI	Italian Communist Party
PDF	Peoples Democratic Front (Coalition of PSI and PCI)
PLI	Italian Liberal Party
PNM	Monarchist National Party
PRI	Italian Republican Party
PSI	Italian Socialist Party

Italian Trade Unions and Associations

ACI	Central Committee of the Italy Action Committee
ALCI	Christian Association of Italian Workers
ASY	Ancient Society of Youth
CA	Catholic Action
CGIL	Italian General Confederation of Labor
CISL	Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions
FUCI	Italian University Student Federation
FUCIG	Italian University Student Federation Girls
FIF	Federation of Italian Farmers
GF	Italian Catholic Young Women
IEC	Italian Employers Confederation

IFCM	Italian Federation of Catholic Men
IFO	Italian Feminist Organization
PSLI	Socialist Party of Italian Workers
UIL	Italian Labor Union

Chilean Political Parties

API	Independent Popular Action
CMil	Chilean Military
DN	National Democrats
DR	Radical Democrats
IC	Christian Left
MAPU	Unitary Action Movement
PCCCH	Communist Party of Chile
PCT	Traditionalist Conservative Party
PD	Democratic Party
PDC	Christian Democratic Party
PEDENA	National Democratic Party
PIR	Radical Left
PL	Liberty Party
PN	National Party
PR	Radical Party
PSC	Chilean Socialist Party
PSD	Socialist Democratic Party
PSCH	Socialist Communist Party
PSP	Popular Socialist Party

Chilean Trade Unions and Associations

ABIF	Association of Banks and Financial Institutions
CCB	Chilean Construction Board
CCC	Central Chamber of Commerce
CDCC	Confederation of Truck Owners
CGCDPIC	Union Confederation of Business Retailer and Small Industry

Coproco	Production Confederation
CPTC	Council of Production Transport and Commerce
FECh	University of Chile Student Union
FMT	Masons, Firefighters, Teachers Associations
PA	Professionals Association
SFFS	Industrial Development Association
SNA	National Agriculture Association
SNM	National Association of Mining
WMC	Women's Aid & Mothers' Clubs

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest agency in the United States government with over 1.4 million active-duty personnel and 718,000 civilian employees.¹ At any given time, the DOD has approximately 450,000 members deployed or stationed overseas in more than 150 countries.² By contrast, “the lead institution for the conduct of American diplomacy,” the Department of State (DOS), employs some 13,000 foreign-service officers and around 45,000 locally employed staff at overseas posts.³ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employment numbers are classified; however, this study assumes CIA employment numbers are similar to those of the DOS. Comparing the three agencies, the Department of Defense—with its complex relationships with foreign governments, global presence, and personnel capacity—is an underutilized resource in current American political warfare and diplomacy strategy.

Today’s policymakers and strategists have yet to tap the full potential of the Department of Defense’s political warfare (PW) capabilities where PW is defined as the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives in both covert and overt action.⁴ This thesis reveals how the Department of Defense contributed to political warfare during the Cold War, when political warfare was at its peak, and traces DOD involvement in combined DOD, CIA, and DOS political warfare efforts. This perspective will assist in identifying where current DOD capabilities may be applied to advance future political warfare strategies. In evaluating these Cold War cases, this thesis develops analytical frameworks using social movement theory and

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, “About the Department of Defense,” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed March 16, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/about/>.

² Defense Manpower Data Center, “Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength: By Service, Regional Area, and Country,” Excel Document (Defense Manpower Data Center, February 4, 2015), <https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/>; U.S. Department of Defense, “About the Department of Defense,” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed March 16, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/about/>.

³ “U.S. Department of State: Mission,” U.S. Department of State, February 16, 2014, <http://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do/mission>.

⁴ George Kennan, “Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 269: National Security Council Meeting on Political Warfare May 4, 1948,” Memorandum (Washington, DC: National Security Council, May 4, 1948), <http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm>.

strategy concepts to explain PW actions according to approach, target attribution, and the effects on a target's political environment.

Extensive research in the fields of political warfare and social movement theory has been conducted, but there is little information available that combines these areas of study. This thesis addresses this shortcoming by merging concepts from political warfare and social movement theory to develop a new conceptual framework with which to evaluate proposed political warfare. This framework can be applied in a variety of political environments and adapted to rapidly changing dynamics, and the models presented can be used to organize and evaluate future planning, assessment, and strategy. While this thesis focuses on historical practices in U.S. political warfare, it uses modern sociological theory as the analytical tool, applying social movement concepts to increase the potential application of political warfare and advance scholarship in this field.

A. PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL WARFARE, 2015

If one wants to define the future, one must study the past.

—Confucius (551–479 BC)

In June 2013, the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan think tank, published a memorandum on political warfare intended for policymakers and opinion leaders. Max Boot and Michael Doran, the memorandum's authors, believe that "the U.S. government has gotten out of the habit of waging political warfare since the end of the Cold War."⁵ They observe that U.S. foreign policy has focused more on public diplomacy efforts to "tell America's story" than on substantively influencing foreign audiences for a U.S. strategic objective.⁶

The problem is that no government agency- not the State Department, not the Pentagon, and not the CIA—views political warfare as a core mission. This gap is partially filled by the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, entities created during the Reagan administration to promote democracy

⁵ Max Boot and Michael Doran, "Political-warfare: Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 33," *Council on Foreign Relations*, June 2013, 1, <http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/political-warfare/p30894>.

⁶ Ibid.

abroad in an overt manner. But these organizations primarily focus on the procedures of democracy—training activists to conduct campaigns and elections—rather than trying to influence substantively who assumes power. That has rightly allowed them to maintain a neutral reputation but also leaves a yawning gap in the U.S. government’s capabilities.⁷

This gap has contributed to a lack of focus, authority, and direction in all aspects of political warfare. It has made U.S. political leaders reactive to global events and reliant on coercive measures, such as overt military force and economic sanctions, to influence international opponents.⁸ In a speech at the National Defense University, President Obama asserted that the current overt, coercive, military-centered policy in foreign diplomacy runs the risk of creating enemies and undermines international public opinion of the United States.⁹ Rather than reacting to international political events, it may be time to learn from experience and take a robust, holistic approach to international diplomacy by exploring the entire spectrum of options.

In the Cold War, the United States waged political warfare through a variety of mechanisms—for example, covert funding of noncommunist parties and anti-communist magazines, organizations, artists, and intellectuals in Europe and Latin America.¹⁰ Although the Cold War is over, the practices and policies of that era may apply today.

Boot and Doran suggest that political strategies and tactics developed during the Cold War could help the United States gain influence with foreign governments and undermine the current state and non-state enemies of the United States¹¹ The authors discuss the current conflicts in the Middle East and argue that Cold War strategies may be used to combat Islamic-extremist organizations and ideologies and the governments

⁷ Ibid., 2.

⁸ Max Boot and Michael Doran, “Department of Dirty Tricks,” *Foreign Policy*, June 28, 2013, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/28/departments-of-dirty-tricks/>.

⁹ Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University” (Fort McNair Washington, DC, May 23, 2013), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university>.

¹⁰ Boot and Doran, “Political-warfare: Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 33,” 2.

¹¹ Boot and Doran, “Department of Dirty Tricks.”

that support them.¹² However, Boot and Doran believe the United States currently lacks the organizational framework for implementing an effective political warfare strategy.

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This thesis provides an assessment of political warfare during the Cold War to identify areas for increased Department of Defense involvement in the planning, development, and practice of political warfare. The following research questions are posed:

1. How does DOD involvement in political warfare strategy and practice affect U.S. PW objectives?
2. How can expanding the DOD's role in political warfare increase the available policy options for today's decision makers?
3. What are some ways the DOD can support political warfare and its objectives?

This thesis provides a definition of political warfare, offers strategy approaches with associated actions, and develops analytical tools to evaluate PW actions, contexts, and effects in the political environment. Applying the analytical frameworks based on social movement theory and strategy concepts to historic cases of PW can assist in identifying effective practices raising possibilities for increased DOD involvement today.

The scope of this thesis is limited to political warfare, social movement theory, and cases of American political warfare during the Cold War. Kennan's description of an overt and covert political warfare spectrum is combined with the concept of direct and indirect approaches to classify PW actions according to the approach implemented and the attribution of the action.

Collective action has been one of the primary ways to achieve a political objective. The study of collective action is predominantly in the domain of sociology, psychology, anthropology, economics, and political science. This research uses the lens of sociology and political science as these fields emphasize the collective actions of state and non-state actors. Collective action models found within economics, psychology, and

¹² Boot and Doran, "Political-warfare: Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 33," 3.

anthropology are outside the scope of this research due to their narrower focus in research and collective action model development.

Sociology offers many theories as to the processes involved in collective action. This study focuses on the “contentious politics mobilization” (CPM) model developed by Dough McAdams, Charles Tilly, and Sydney Tarrow. The CPM model pertains to a political environment wherein competing groups use collective action to achieve opposing political objectives. This model expands McAdam’s political process model, which explains collective action processes within a social movement, and identifies the processes contributing to group mobilization in a competitive political environment hosting multiple organizations. In such an environment, organizations, movements, and governments use a similar repertory of collective action processes to achieve legitimacy or maintain control over a population.

The framework developed in this thesis adapts the CPM model for use in political warfare, enabling a PW actor to identify the general areas within a political environment that can be manipulated to achieve an objective. The new framework also identifies areas where an actor can assess the effectiveness of the PW strategy and adjust future actions to achieve the desired result.

In the historical studies presented, the United States employed various techniques to prevent communist expansion and influence as revealed in the declassified documents consulted in this research. Of all the potential U.S. PW cases, this study chose Italy, from 1943–1948, to illustrate the DOD contribution to PW in the transition from WWII to the Cold War. This is a case in which DOD involvement in a comprehensive political warfare strategy helped achieve long-term objectives through the successful manipulation of a political system. The Chile case, from 1961–1973, was selected to show DOD’s enduring contribution in bolstering a PW strategy that had failed to sustain its initial success. The Chile case illustrates DOD as an essential PW element to achieve the end objective after political system manipulation has failed. The Chilean case calls attention to the DOD’s covert and overt capabilities in achieving an immediate political warfare objective—one which, as some scholars suggest, yielded negative long-term effects.

1. Theoretical Framework

Social movement theory and strategy concepts are used to develop a theoretical framework for describing the approaches, attribution, impact, and effect of PW actions. These elements illuminate how political warfare is conducted and clarify the relationship between PW actions and the environment in which they are used.

2. Approach and attribution

To analyze political warfare actions by approach and attribution, a taxonomy is developed to categorize actions as direct, indirect, overt, or covert. These categories enable insights into the conduct of PW while differentiating among the approaches that individual PW actors may take, as seen in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The Political Warfare Spectrum

Figure 2 represents how McAdam et al.'s CPM model helps identify the areas where political warfare actions influence group mobilization, as well as the effect these action have on a target's political environment.




Figure 2. The Contentious Politics Mobilization Model¹³

To conceptualize a political setting, Charles Tilly's polity model is used to provide a static visualization. This model, presented in Figure 3, defines a political space in terms of the boundaries between members, non-members, and outside actors. Applied to political warfare, the polity model identifies key actors, the approaches used by different actors, and existing and emerging coalitions. It also contributes to case analysis by linking U.S. PW approaches to specific actors or groups. The polity model can be used as a targeting tool to identify influential groups and organizations and visualize how they could be leveraged in PW.

¹³ Doug McAdam, Sidney G Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Modified original model adding the Social Construct/ Framing Process image.




Figure 3. The Tilly Polity Model¹⁴

3. Methodology

A qualitative analysis of political warfare during the Cold War is conducted by identifying the actions of the CIA, DOS, and DOD using declassified cases in Italy 1943–48 and Chile 1961–73. Political warfare actions are categorized by approach and impact on the political environment. This approach identifies positive and negative long-term effects as a basis for determining successful and unsuccessful political warfare practices.

Both primary and secondary sources are used in evaluation. Primary sources include U.S. declassified diplomatic correspondence, instructions, and case analyses. Secondary sources consist of scholarly studies, interpretations, and reflections on the historical events associated with CIA, DOS, and the DOD actions, which are categorized according to the theoretical frameworks developed in this study.

The result of the case analysis is a comparison of agency actions presented in tabular form using the theoretical framework categories as the categorization tool (see template in Table 1). Comparison among the agencies provides insight into their

¹⁴ Ibid. Modified image adding subjects arrow.

historical contribution, their typical roles in political warfare strategy, and the potential utility of the DOD in the present day political warfare environment.

Table 1. Case-Study Template

Agency	Broad Social Change	Attribution of Opportunity or Threat	Social Construct	Social / Organization Appropriation
Overt, Direct				
Covert, Direct				
Covert, Indirect				
Overt, Indirect				

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II. POLITICAL WARFARE AND APPROACH FRAMEWORK

Political warfare is not new. Early writings on political warfare include Sun Tzu's *Art of War* in 512 BC and Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* in 433 BC.¹⁵ Sun Tzu writes, "To win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all."¹⁶ Political warfare can be thought of as those activities in preparation for war that use influence, coercion, and manipulation, rather than direct military force, to achieve political objectives.

A. POLITICAL WARFARE DEFINED

Ambassador George Kennan defines political warfare "as the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives."¹⁷ The means for achieving the objective vary, depending upon the resources available, the intelligence gained by researching the target population, and the ideas and ingenuity of the political warfare planners.¹⁸ Political warfare focuses on "winning the war of ideas,"¹⁹ the "marshaling of human support, opposition, or energies"²⁰ or "extending control over individual political entities, political groups or factions within the state, the nation state itself or even multinational groups."²¹ Psychological processes are used to influence the actions of a target population. The political warfare actor's ability to control or direct popular collective action or inaction within a target country is his primary way of achieving an objective.

¹⁵ Paul Smith Jr., *On Political War*, 1st ed. (National Defense University Press, 1989), 30, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a233501.pdf.

¹⁶ Wu Sun and Samuel Blair Griffith, *Sun Tzu The Art of War: Translated (from the Chinese) and with an Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, Etc.* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971, 1971).

¹⁷ Kennan, "Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 269," 1.

¹⁸ British Political-warfare Executive, *The Meaning, Techniques, and Methods of Political-warfare* (Great Britain: British Government, 1942), 11, <http://www.psywar.org>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla, *War: Ends and Means* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 77.

²¹ Paul Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating The Politics of Other Nations*, 1st ed. (Chicago: Quadrangle Book, 1964), 43.

According to Kennan, PW actions can range from straightforward alliances to clandestine support of an underground resistance in a hostile state; any and all instruments available to a nation's command are potential means.²² Other experts highlight propaganda, agents of influence, sabotage, coups de main, economic sanctions, and support for foreign groups, as but a few examples.²³ For the United States, the means of political warfare employed is related to which agency has the experience, resources, and responsibility to carry out an action.

B. ORGANIZING U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE ACTORS

Within the United States government, the primary agencies responsible for acts of overt and covert political warfare are the DOS, DOD, and CIA. Recognizing the need to coordinate agency efforts, Kennan established a governing board within the DOS to oversee all political warfare actions.²⁴ The DOS became the lead organizer of PW actions, primarily focusing on overt actions. The CIA was responsible for covert acts in support of DOS strategy. The Department of Defense covered the range of actions, taking direction from the DOS when acting overtly and from the CIA when acting covertly; this ability to work across the spectrum made the DOD a valuable resource. Building upon Kennan's coverage of overt and covert actions, the next section develops a framework to classify PW actions according to approach and target attribution.

C. THE SPECTRUM OF POLITICAL WARFARE

Generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage; use the extraordinary to win.

—Sun Tzu (544–496 BC)

Kennan's description of PW covers the covert–overt spectrum but fails to describe all the approaches political warfare actors can take. To assess PW actions beyond the covert–overt spectrum, this study offers an analytical tool that adds direct and indirect elements of strategy.

²² Kennan, "Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 269," 1.

²³ Seabury and Codevilla, *War*, 161.

²⁴ Kennan, "Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 269."

D. DIRECT AND INDIRECT: CHENG AND CH'I

This section introduces Sun Tzu's concept of *cheng* and *ch'i* as a supplement to covert and overt concepts. Strategies of political warfare may have multiple approaches. Covert and overt classifications identify an action according to the target's perception of the action. But perception alone provides only one aspect of how political warfare is conducted. *Cheng* is the direct approach, or Sun Tzu's "normal force," and *ch'i* is the indirect approach, or Sun Tzu's "extraordinary force."²⁵ Application of these concepts allows PW actions to be categorized in four quadrants, as illustrated in Figure 4 (also presented in Figure 1 page 6).




Figure 4. The Political Warfare Spectrum

The PW spectrum in Figure 4 classifies actions according to approach and attribution. The spectrum is not meant to suggest that PW objectives are achieved by limiting actions to a single type of approach. Instead, the combined actions of political warfare should include action from among all fields in the spectrum. In the words of Sun Tzu, "In battle there are only normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are

²⁵ Sun and Griffith, *Sun Tzu The Art of War*, 91.

limitless; none can comprehend them all...the interactions are as endless as that of interlocking rings. Who can determine where one ends and the other begins?”²⁶

1. Overt, Direct Actions

In Figure 4, the upper-left quadrant signifies actions that can be classified as overt and direct. Overt political warfare is any action conducted by the United States that is plainly or readily apparent, as opposed to secret or hidden. Direct actions are aimed directly toward a target, indicating a direct interaction between the target and the U.S. government or its entities. Examples of overt, direct PW action are alliances between countries, “white” propaganda, military buildup along a defined border, trade restrictions, and diplomatic conferences, messages, and announcements.

2. Covert, Direct Actions

The upper-right quadrant of the PW spectrum represents direct, covert actions. Covert political warfare is any action that can be attributed to a third party and does not directly implicate the actor’s involvement. One example of a direct, covert action is the CIA’s use of psychological warfare during operation PBSUCCESS to overthrow the Guatemalan government in 1954. The CIA set up a secret Florida based radio station to broadcast into Guatemala with programing implying the signal originated from an internal resistance movement. This type of action is called “black” propaganda. The radio station is owned and operated by an American agency, not a third party. Because the actor implementing the PW action is part of the U.S. government, its actions are direct U.S. actions. Another example of a direct, covert action is a military raid on infrastructure in a target country where an insurgent group could be blamed or framed for the action. The Russians conducted direct, covert actions in the Crimea by inserting professional military soldiers posing as Crimean separatists.

²⁶ Sun and Griffith, *Sun Tzu The Art of War*, 138.

3. Covert, Indirect Actions

The lower-right quadrant represents covert, indirect political warfare actions. Indirect PW is conducted through an intermediary not associated with the U.S. government. The intermediary, wittingly or unwittingly, conducts actions on behalf of the United States for some PW objective. An example of a covert, indirect action is providing financial support to a foreign political party using a private company to channel funds. The intended recipient of the funds is unaware that they originated with the U.S. government, believing they were from a private company. In this case, the private company is the intermediary; with the intended target being the political actor whom the U.S. government deems is supporting its PW objective. Unconventional warfare (UW) in a limited-war scenario is another example of covert, indirect PW. In limited, unconventional war, an outside government covertly supports a foreign underground resistance within a target country. In this case, the intermediary is the underground-resistance force, whose actions target the existing foreign regime.

4. Overt, Indirect Actions

The bottom-left quadrant contains political warfare actions that are overt and indirect. An example is the DOS influence on a political ally to conduct an action on behalf of the U.S. In the Italian case examined in this research, the U.S. government used influence with the British to gain their diplomatic support of the Socialist Party of Italian Workers (PSLI). This British action helped legitimize the new political party, where similar U.S. actions would have hindered the overall objective. The U.S. government used the British government as an intermediary to conduct an overt action of political warfare on a target country. Unconventional warfare (UW) conducted in a general war scenario is another case of an overt, indirect action—for example, U.S. military assistance to the Kurdish forces in Iraq against the Islamic State or former Saddam regime. The United States is overt in its presence and assistance to the Kurdish forces, but indirect in its approach. The U.S. uses Kurdish ground forces as an intermediary, with the intended target being the Islamic State or the former Saddam government.

The quadrants within the two-dimensional spectrum of political warfare are used as the first framework to assess the actions of political war. This framework helps reveal patterns to provide insight into the successful combination of political warfare approaches.

E. CONCLUSION

The analysis tool developed in this research categorizes PW actions along a covert-overt axis and a direct-indirect axis. This two-dimensional framework provides insights into how the United States conducts political warfare. The next chapter turns to social movement theory and models to describe political environments and the group mobilization process.

III. POLITICAL WARFARE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

The ability to influence collective action or inaction is key in achieving PW objectives. Political warfare seeks to effect change or gain influence over the thinking of a population to induce a reaction or action to support a political warfare objective. The British focused on “winning the war of ideas”²⁷ to achieve action or inaction in WWII. Seabury and Codevilla, two political warfare scholars, highlight the “marshaling of human support, opposition, or energies”²⁸ as best practices. Blackstock, a political warfare theorist, emphasizes “extending control over individual political entities, political groups or factions within the state, the nation state itself, or even multinational groups.”²⁹ It is agreed that influencing the process by which group mobilization or collective action occurs is the way to achieve a PW objective.

The processes involved in explaining collective action are explored through the study of social movements. The social movement scholars Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow define collective action as a group’s “coordinated efforts taken on behalf of a shared interest or program.”³⁰ According to Jonathan Christiansen, social movements are “organized yet informal social entities that are engaged in extra-institutional conflict that is oriented towards a goal. These goals can be aimed at a specific and narrow policy or be more broadly aimed at cultural change.”³¹ Stephen Engel suggests that “social movements are inherently and fundamentally a political phenomenon since their target is the state.”³² Social movements and PW actors use collective action to achieve their

²⁷ British Political-warfare Executive, *The Meaning, Techniques, and Methods of Political-warfare*, 11.

²⁸ Seabury and Codevilla, *War: Ends and Means*, 77.

²⁹ Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion*, 43.

³⁰ Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, *Contentious Politics* (Oxford, Oxon, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 216.

³¹ Jonathan Christiansen, “Four Stages of Social Movement” (EBSCO Publishing Inc, 2009), 2, <http://www.ebscohost.com/uploads/imported/thisTopic-dbTopic-1248.pdf>.

³² Stephen M. Engel, *The Unfinished Revolution: Social Movement Theory and the Gay and Lesbian Movement* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 12.

objectives. Their common use of collective action makes the study of social movements relevant to the study of political warfare.

Many of the processes involved in promoting collective action for a social movement are the same or similar to the processes a political warfare actor would use to influence or induce group collective action or inaction in support of a political warfare objective. The last chapter focused on developing a construct to analyze actions based on approach and attribution. This chapter investigates the social movement theories that explain collective action and identifies tools that can be implemented or modified to analyze political warfare. Accordingly, we now focus on the political environments where actions take place. Social movement theory models are adapted to identify the areas of a political setting where PW actions have an impact.

To frame a PW setting, it helps to identify its static and dynamic characteristics. Static characteristics define a political space, the actors within that space, and their relationships. Dynamic characteristics include processes of mobilization and PW actions effect. Identifying static and dynamic characteristics in the case studies examined uncovers some common themes in U.S. political warfare.

Tilly's polity model is useful for mapping the static characteristics of a political system and linking the PW framework to a political environment. The contentious politics mobilization model is added to accommodate the dynamic processes within a political environment and to identify interactions among competing organizations to reveal how PW actions affect the mobilization characteristics in the dynamic environment.

A. SIMPLE POLITY MODEL: A STATIC POLITICAL SETTING

All social movements and group collective action take place within a political setting. Tilly's simple polity model visualization conceptualizes the political boundaries within a setting by identifying the limits of governmental jurisdictions and distinguishing between groups with direct access to government and those without. Second, the model identifies the key players and groups present in the political space, and positions them according to their level of government access and jurisdiction. The third function is to

identify the relationships between key players within and across the conceptualized boundaries. Figure 5 (also presented in Figure 2 on page 8) provides an example of a Tilly's simple polity model.³³




Figure 5. The Tilly Polity Model³⁴

Tilly uses categories to sort the key players by their position in the political setting, which depends on access to government, location in the political setting, and level of political organization.

- **Polity members** are constituted political actors enjoying routine access to government agents and resources.
- **Non-polity members** are groups or individuals outside of the polity.
- **Challengers** are political actors that lack routine access to the polity.
- **Subjects** are persons and groups not currently organized into constituted political actors.

³³ Doug McAdam, Sidney G Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 13.

³⁴ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*. Modified model adding Subjects arrow.

- **Outside actors** are those groups or individuals, including other governments, that are outside the jurisdiction of the government.³⁵

For the case studies analyzed, the polity model simplifies the complexity of political settings. It also identifies the location of the groups or individuals, in the political space, the U.S. targets for influence through supportive action and, by adapting Tilly's original model, clarifies the nature of the coalitions by differentiating between covert and overt interactions.

B. "CONTENTIOUS POLITICS": A DYNAMIC MODEL ADAPTED FOR POLITICAL WARFARE

Unlike McAdam's political-process model (discussed in detail in Appendix A), the CPM model describes the interactive processes between multiple political organizations, with each group seeking its political objectives in competition with the others. The CPM model captures the interactive processes of collective action for various forms of government by describing group interactions that occur inside and outside the governmental system.

The CPM model adapted by this research identifies four general areas an outside actor can use to manipulate political interactions within a target country. These classifications aid in the analysis of planned PW strategies in the cases. In addition to the areas of manipulation, this research identified an area of evolution that can be used to assess the effectiveness of a PW strategy. Using the two fields in the adapted mode will help a PW actor predict the outcomes of contemplated actions.

1. Politics and Contention

McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow define contentious politics as

episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect

³⁵ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 12.

the interests of at least one of the claimants. Roughly translated, the definition refers to collective political struggle.³⁶

Politics and social movements have similar and overlapping processes—the processes that explain social movements can also be applied to institutionalized political actions. McAdams et al. state, “the boundaries between institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics are hard to draw with precision. The two sorts of politics interact incessantly and involve similar causal processes.”³⁷ Because the processes of social movements (as non-institutionalized politics) and institutionalized politics overlap, the authors can apply their expertise in social movement theory to institutionalized political processes within an established system of government.

The CPM model also provides a new, dynamic approach to understanding the interactions among competing organizations within institutionalized political systems. Using the underlying theories of social movement development, the CPM model explains the dynamic interaction between two social movement organizations within the same political space, uncovering how two political organizations with access to government interact—or how a social movement interacts with a competing political establishment. The processes of dynamic interaction help explain the emergence, assimilation, and decline of a claimant organization confronting an institutionalized or non-institutionalized opposition group.

McAdam et al. define two types of political contention: contained and transgressive.

a. Contained Contention

Contained contention occurs when all parties are previously established actors employing well-established means of claim making. It consists of episodic, public, collective interactions among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to claims, (b) the claims would,

³⁶ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 5.

³⁷ Ibid., 7.

if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants, and (c) all parties to the conflict were previously established as constituted political actors.³⁸

b. Transgressive Contention

Transgressive contention consists of episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to claims, (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants, (c) at least some parties to the conflict are newly self-identified political actors, and/or (d) at least some parties employ innovative collective action. Action qualifies as innovative if it incorporates claims, selects objects of claims, includes collective self-representation, or adopts means that are either unprecedented or forbidden by the regime in question.³⁹

By accommodating contained and transgressive categories, the CPM framework can apply equally to social movements from outside the polity and contentious politics from within. The versatility of this model makes it ideal for U.S. political warfare—it applies to many types of governments and competing organizations. The CPM model helps a PW actor pinpoint the target areas that can be manipulated to achieve an objective. The individual components of this model expand McAdam’s political-process model into a competitive environment of multiple actors. The political-process model is used when looking at the mobilization processes internal to a social movement. The CPM model is used when looking at the process that effect group mobilization external to the social movement or political actor.

2. Contentious Politics Mobilization Model

As illustrated in Figure 6, the CPM model combines two of McAdam’s political-process models and puts them in competition. The CPM model is a more dynamic explanation of collective action than the original political-process model, explaining the

³⁸ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 7.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

interactive mechanisms of how organizations grow and decline in the face of competition.

The CPM model also broadens its application beyond the collective action of social movements, to institutionalized political action. The background processes of the CPM model continue to operate under the same or similar principles outlined in McAdam's political-process model; however, the new construct expands the scope of the mobilization process, providing explanation of competitive interaction. The political-process model can be used to explain the internal processes of social movement development. The CPM model is used to explain the external processes of competition that affect social movement development. Figure 6, also introduced in Figure 3 on page 7, is the contentious politics mobilization model depicting the interactive process dynamics.




Figure 6. The Contentious Politics Mobilization Model⁴⁰

⁴⁰ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*. Modified image adding the Social Construct/Framing Process image at center

a. *Broad Social-Change Processes*

McAdam et al. describe how broad change processes affect both the member and challenger. Figure 6 indicates the impact broad change has on the two groups, with arrows pointing to the attribution of threat and opportunity fields of both. The processes leading to broad change include human migration, the strength of the economy, third-party economic stimulus, economic sanctions, famine, and population growth. As in the political-process model, broad socioeconomic change and change processes of the CPM model can increase or decrease political opportunities and threats for both member and challenger organizations. Unlike the political-process model, the broad change processes of the CPM model do not directly impact organizational strength. In the new model, the organizational strength aspect of the political-process model becomes a part of the social-appropriation field.

b. *Attribution of Opportunities and Threats*

The CPM model modifies the political opportunities and threats of the political-process model and incorporates the notion of attribution. McAdam et al. postulate that opportunities and threats are not objective categories, but depend on a collective attribution developed through a social construct that is aided and influenced by the collective action frames voiced by various actors, not just social movement leaders.⁴¹ For an opportunity or threat to be recognized, it must be “visible to potential challengers and perceived as an opportunity.... [The] attribution of opportunity or threat [becomes] an activating mechanism responsible in part for the mobilization of previously inert populations.”⁴² The attribution of opportunity and threat leads to an increase or decrease in the “mobilization potential” described in McAdam’s political-process model.

c. *Social or Organizational Appropriation*

The political-process model focuses on pre-existing mobilizing structures and resources indigenous to the social movement as a means of mobilization. By contrast, the

⁴¹ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 43–45.

⁴² Ibid., 43.

CPM model focuses more on “the active appropriation of sites for mobilization.”⁴³ Figure 6 indicates the relationship between the attribution of threat and opportunity and organizational appropriation, with a single arrow pointing to social or organizational appropriation. McAdam et al. modify the political-process model because they believe challengers are more likely to possess organizational deficits than resource deficits. “Challengers, rather than creating new organizations, appropriate existing ones and turn them into vehicles of mobilization. Social appropriation... permits oppressed or resource-poor populations to sometimes overcome their organizational deficits.”⁴⁴ Mobilizing structures can be preexisting or created in the course of contention, but in either case they need to be appropriated by a movement as vehicles for struggle.⁴⁵ Movements engage more in appropriating other social organizations than in building new organizations from scratch.

Group mobilization and recruitment in the CPM model are similar to the mobilization and recruitment process outlined in McAdam’s political-process model. The only variation is the shift in focus to organizational appropriation and block recruiting over individual recruitment and the development of a new social movement. Once the mobilization process occurs, groups begin to engage in collective action. The success of group collective action depends on the group’s ability to innovate collective action tactics and the response from opposition groups.

d. Innovative Collective Action

The CPM model expands the political-process model ideas of collective action. Tilly and Tarrow claim that collective action, or the process of claim making, is a result of the “repertoires of contention” for a given population—that is, what people do when they make a claim, which depends on what they know how to do and what society has come to expect them to do within a culturally acceptable set of options.⁴⁶

⁴³ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 44.

⁴⁴ Ibid.s

⁴⁵ Ibid., 45.

⁴⁶ Sidney G Tarrow, “Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of Contention,” *Social Science History* 17, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 283.

Contentious repertoires are arrays of contentious performances that are currently known and available within some set of political actors. Contentious performances are relatively familiar standardized ways in which one set of political actors makes collective claims on some other set of political actors.⁴⁷

Contentious repertoires are groupings of contentious performances.⁴⁸ Tilly and Tarrow observe, “Repertoires vary from place to place, time to time, and pair to pair [or challenger to member]. But on the whole, when people make collective claims, they innovate within the limits set by the repertoire already established for the place, time, and pair.”⁴⁹ Tilly and Tarrow explain collective action innovation by its interrelationships with perceived opportunities and threats, mobilizing structures, and the framing processes.

Repertoires draw on the identities, social ties, and organizational forms that constitute everyday social life. From those identities, social ties and organizational forms emerge both the collective claims that people make and the means they have for making claims. In the course of contending or watching others contend, people learn the interactions that can make a political difference as well as the locally shared meaning of those interactions. The changing interactions of everyday social organization, cumulative experience with contention, and regime intervention produces incremental alterations in contentious performances.⁵⁰

The innovation that occurs within contentious performances attempts to produce a desired political effect or outcome. Those contentious performances that are found effective become part of a society’s contentious repertoire. The successful performances then diffuse across social networks, to be applied by new claimants under new social contexts.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Tilly and Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 11.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 16.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 23.

⁵¹ Tarrow, “Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of Contention,” 286.

In McAdam et al.'s CPM model, the repertoires of contentious action of both member and challenger organizations are put into an interactive field of competition. This interaction is indicated by the up and down arrows in Figure 6. The outcomes of the interaction can lead to the escalation or diminishment of a shared perceived uncertainty for the parties involved in the contentious performance. The process of group reflection is indicated by the arrow pointing from innovative collective action to escalation of perceived uncertainty in Figure 6. The resulting outcome of the contentious performance affects both the challenger's and the member's attribution of threat and opportunity. This process is indicated in Figure 6 by arrows pointing from the escalation of perceived uncertainty to the attribution of opportunity or threats. The cycle from attribution, to mobilization, to innovative collective action and interaction, with consequent escalation or decline in uncertainty then contributing back to the group attribution of opportunity and threat, continuously evolves as contention occurs within a political setting.

e. Social Construct and Framing

The political-process model focuses on “cognitive liberation” as a function of a group's framing efforts to identify a problem and present a solution. In the CPM model, cognitive liberation is replaced by the concept of the social construct. The social construct is interactively framed or influenced by challengers, their opponents, state entities, third parties, and the media.⁵² The media, and other sources of communication, inadvertently frame a movement for its participants and for others within a political setting. Cultural resources then constrain and shape the deliberate framing efforts of movement leaders and opposition groups.⁵³ The social construct is a psychological process that affects all other variables identified in the model. The framing process determines how different groups within a political setting try to influence the social construct to influence the mobilization efforts of both member and challenger organizations. For more information on the framing process see Appendix A.

⁵² McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 45.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 44.

3. Contentious Politics Mobilization Model: Areas for Third-Party Manipulation and Evaluation

The four areas of manipulation in the CPM model and the area of evaluation are identified in Figure 7.




Figure 7. Contentious Politics Mobilization Model Adapted to Political Warfare⁵⁴

⁵⁴ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*. Modified the model for application to political warfare identifying the fields of manipulation and evaluation area.

a. Area 1: Broad Change Processes

The first area for manipulation, illustrated in Figure 8, is the broad social change process indicated by oval 1. Broad social change processes affect a target's environment by increasing or decreasing opportunities for challengers and members. Third parties or outside actors can manipulate broad social change through economic processes, population migration, and trade, to name a few.




Figure 8. Contentious Politics Manipulation Areas⁵⁵

b. Area 2: Attribution of Threat and Opportunity

The second area designated for manipulation, illustrated in Figure 8, is political opportunity and threats, as indicated by oval 2. The political opportunities structure of McAdam's political-process model is directly associated with the attribution of threat and opportunity. A third-party PW actor can influence the political elites or movement leaders of a target country using bribery, coercion, or other manipulative methods. Third parties with influence over key leaders can attempt to shape or manipulate the actions of those leaders to create opportunities for groups whose actions align with third-party PW objectives. A third-party actor could use his influence over key leaders to generate

⁵⁵ Ibid. Modified the original model for political warfare by identifying manipulation areas.

actions to suppress or oppress efforts of groups making claims that do not align with the third-party's PW objectives.

c. Area 3: Social Construct

The third area available for manipulation is the social construct, indicated by the oval 3 in Figure 8. Media outlets and organization leaders, under third-party control or influence, can manipulate the social construct to reflect a third-party's narrative. Third parties can also directly contribute to the social construct through normal media channels and public addresses that target a population within the political setting.

Media outlets and organization leaders can be manipulated to frame events favorable to a third-party PW objective. Populations receptive to the social construct frames being used influence the group's attribution of threat or opportunity. The attribution of opportunity increases the mobilization potential of organizations or individuals in social or organizational appropriation. An increase in threat attribution tends to decrease the mobilization potential of a challenger organization. (For more information on mobilization potential see Appendix A.)

d. Area 4: Organizational or Social Appropriation

The fourth area outlined for third-party influence is organizational or social appropriation, as indicated by oval 4 in Figure 8. Third parties can allocate resources to organizations whose actions align with their objective. Third-party support can influence a challenger or member's ability to appropriate organizations or institutions. Resources to an organization can be increased or decreased by a third party's actions. The availability of resources (money, weapons, food, manpower, training, etc.) affects an organization's ability to mobilize, recruit, and sustain collective action.

e. Area 5: Prediction and Evaluation

This study also uses the CPM model as an evaluation tool to monitor the effectiveness of PW efforts. In Figure 9, the area encompassing the field of innovative collective action and escalation of perceived uncertainty is indicated by rectangle 5. This field becomes the area in which a third-party actor can gauge successes or failures.

Monitoring the outcomes and collective effects in the evaluation area enables a third-party actor to determine the success of a PW action and adjust future strategy in the four manipulation zones to achieve the desired effect. The CPM model provides the actor with a single model to plan, implement, and evaluate a political warfare strategy for a given target country.




Figure 9. Contentious Politics Evaluation Area⁵⁶

C. CONCLUSION

The adapted CPM model and the polity models are tools a PW actor can use to map the environment of a given target country, determine the areas available for manipulation, and evaluate the potential effects a strategy may have on a political setting. The two models help identify challengers and members, organizations and social groups used for mobilization, and the potential political opportunities and threats a PW actor might exploit. The modified CPM model identifies the social construct as a key area of manipulation, which uses media messaging and alternative frames to support a third-party PW objective.

Using the adapted CPM model with an understanding of the political-process model enables a political warfare actor to gauge what collective action repertoires groups

⁵⁶ Ibid. Modified original model for purposes of political warfare identifying the area of PW evaluation.

will enact during mobilization and predict the possible outcomes or responses of the competing parties. By analyzing the interactions that take place during the contentious performances of member and challenger organizations, an actor can adjust a PW strategy to changing conditions. The modified CPM model becomes the framework from which the actor focuses resources, evaluates success and failure, and identifies areas for continued manipulation. The following case studies apply these adapted models to historical events with the PW-spectrum framework in Chapter II.

IV. ITALIAN CASE STUDY: 1943–1948

The transition from actual war to political war was never more apparent than in Italy at the end of WWII. The Allies' defeat of the Axis powers ushered in a new type of war: a political war between two contrasting ideologies, with democracy in the West and communism in the East. Italy was to become a stepping-stone for the United States to develop and test Cold War strategies for combating communist expansion and influence around the world.

This study analyzes U.S. political warfare through the efforts of the DOS, the early CIA, and DOD, beginning with the allied invasion of 1943 and ending with the Italian general election of 1948. Italy was chosen as a PW case due to dominant DOD involvement in shaping the political atmosphere in the transition from war to peace. Efforts conducted by the three agencies are classified according to the direct, indirect, covert, or overt spectrum and aligned with the adapted CPM model in the categories of broad change processes, social constructs, attribution of opportunities and threats, and social or organizational appropriation. Tilly's modified polity model is used to visualize the coalitions of the competing parties by illustrating links across polity lines, government jurisdictions, and third-party influencers. The political warfare-adapted polity model represents how third parties used overt, covert, direct, and indirect coalitions to influence Italian politics. Using the analytical tools developed in Chapters II and III, this analysis shows the accomplishments of each agency and identifies the DOD's contribution to PW strategy.

A. BACKGROUND

During WWII, the military was used to induce Italian political change. The military, acting as an instrument of traditional war, pursued the objectives of Italian military surrender and defeat, regime change, and implementation of a democratic form of government that would be favorable to allied and American influence. The Allies sought to achieve their objective by way of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic manipulation. Diplomatically, they sought Italian political and military leaders

to negotiate an Italian surrender. In the information domain, the allied strategy was aimed at winning the war of ideas, combating fascist ideology and German influence through information operations. Militarily, the Allies sought to defeat the Italian armed forces through overwhelming force, superior strategy and equipment, and to achieve military and political objectives by instigating an Italian popular uprising against fascism and German occupation. These objectives were pursued by manipulating the Italian economy and the information available to the people, creating civil unrest and disorder that weakened Italy's political establishment and German occupational control.

Once the Allies had physical control over Italy and the Italian political establishment, they implemented a transitional government that was commanded by the Allied Control Command and Allied Military Government. As the war ended, allied military control over the Italian political space began to slowly devolve to the Italian political elite, first at the local level and then at the national. At this point, the Allies had reached their main objective of bringing WWII to a close. Now they had to assist in developing an effective Italian government that would be favorable to allied influence. The Allies, and in particular the Americans, did not realize the need for a change in strategy until after the first Italian elections were held in June 1946.

1. Military "Oversight" in the Transitional Government

Immediately following the allied landing in Sicily, the Allied Control Commission began negotiating with King Victor Emmanuel III, the Italian monarch. The King, in an effort to gain favor, orchestrated a coup d'état against Mussolini, resulting in the dictator's arrest. King Victor Emmanuel then proclaimed a new constitutional monarchy, consisting of military leaders and civilian technicians led by the newly appointed Prime Minister, Marshal Pietro Badoglio.⁵⁷ On September 3, 1943, the Badoglio government signed, under pressure, an armistice calling for the cessation of hostilities against allied forces.⁵⁸ Despite the monarchy's efforts to establish a new government, an anti-fascist underground movement began to form that would later

⁵⁷ Norman Kogan, *The Political History of Postwar Italy* (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1966), 4.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

challenge the King's authority. The political parties that developed from the anti-fascist movement later become the focal point of the developing proxy political war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The Committee of National Liberation (CLN), an anti-fascist coalition, formed to challenge the Badoglio government. The CLN consisted primarily of pre-fascist political parties outlawed by the Mussolini dictatorship. The political ideologies of coalition groups ranged from Marxist and socialist ideologies in the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and Italian Socialist Party (PSI) on the left, to capitalist and democratic ideologies on the right. The Christian Democrats (DC) and Italian Liberal Party (PLI) represented the right end of the political spectrum, with more centrist ideologies represented in the Action Party (AP) and the Democratic Labor Party (PDL). The AP and the PDL represented the intellectual community and monarchists, but lacked a popular base of support within the population.⁵⁹ Although the groups' politics and ideologies were at odds, they set aside their differences and formed a united front that focused on the rehabilitation of Italian society, post fascism.⁶⁰

In spite of Prime Minister Badoglio's official prohibition of organized political activity, the CLN gained political power with support from the masses. The CLN effectively inserted itself into government at the local level and began coordinating with both the Allied Military Government and the newly formed Badoglio government. In the liberated south,

the CLN became the center of political activity, while in the central and northern part of Italy, they reverted to clandestine activities in order to organize the resistance movement against the German and neo-fascist occupiers.⁶¹

The Allied Control Commission provided the partisans with weapons, supplies, and financial support, relying heavily on the CLN to coordinate war efforts in the enemy-

⁵⁹ Giuseppe Mammarella, *Italy after Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 37.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

held territories of Northern Italy.⁶² The allied reliance on the CLN at the local level in liberated areas, and in the ongoing war effort in Northern Italy, helped the CLN gain influence with the Allied Military Government. At the insistence of the Allies, the CLN was incorporated into the Badoglio government in Rome.

Initially, the Badoglio government resisted inclusion of the CLN, due to incompatible political ideologies. However, the Allied Control Command forced the transitional Italian government to accommodate the CLN, with all parties, in a newly established cabinet. On June 7, 1944, with the allied liberation of Rome, General MacFarlane insisted on Badoglio's resignation and requested that King Emmanuel abdicate his throne in favor of his son, Prince Humbert. These political changes by the Allies punished the monarchy for the perceived support given to Mussolini in the past. General MacFarlane also removed Badoglio from power because of his ineffectiveness in organizing Italian military support against the Germans as a cobelligerent, coupled with his ineptitude in preventing Mussolini's escape.⁶³ Under McFarlane's direction, the leader of the Democratic Labor Party (PDL), Ivanoe Bonomi, was appointed as prime minister. The inclusion of the CLN and the abdication of the king effectively established the cabinet as the sole representative authority of the people.⁶⁴

The 1943 armistice stipulated unconditional surrender of the Italian military and authorized a new government to be formed under the supervision of the Allied Control Commission and Allied Military Government. The allied military occupation of Italy provided the Italian government an initial opportunity to reorganize and restructure itself in the aftermath of the Mussolini dictatorship. The shortsightedness of the Allies, and in particular the United States, however, prepared conditions for future political conflict. The allied government, consisting predominantly of military leaders, ordered and appointed Italian officials, and formed a new cabinet with representation from all anti-

⁶² Mammarella, *Italy after Fascism*, 82–83.

⁶³ Luigi Villari, *The Liberation of Italy 1943–1947* (Appleton, WI: C. C. Nelson Publishing Company, 1959), 124.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 126.

fascist groups, to include communists with known connections to the Soviet Union.⁶⁵ The decision by the Allies and U.S. military to include the Communist Party in the new Italian government set the stage for the political conflict that became known as the Cold War.

2. Can Democracy Prevail?

On December 31, 1945, the Allied Control Command and the Allied Military Government ceased to operate in Italy. The 1945 appointment of Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi, a Christian Democrat, helped usher in the new Italian government, with public general elections scheduled for June 1946. This first general election would decide Italy's fate as a constitutional monarchy or a republic. The United States did not realize the extent of the Italian communist and socialist political threat until receiving the 1946 election results.

The outcome of the June elections established the Italian government as a representative democracy and indicated the level of popular support each political party had within the population. The Christian Democrats had the greatest share of the popular vote, with 35.2%. The Socialist Party (PSI) came in second with 20.7%, followed by the Communist Party (PCI) with 18.9%.⁶⁶ Surprising the United States, the PSI and the PCI received almost 40% of the vote. It became clear that future Italian elections could lead to a communist or a socialist government that would threaten U.S. and allied influence in Italy (see Appendix B for detailed information on Italian political parties).

Once the U.S. and allies realized the socialist and communist threat, they began to develop new strategies to limit communist expansion in Western spheres of influence. These new strategies in Italy became the foundation of future U.S. political warfare policies.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 30.

⁶⁶ Donald Sassoon, *Contemporary Italy: Politics, Economy, and Society Since 1945* (London: New York: Longman, 1986), 167.

B. BEGINNING OF U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE

With the Christian Democratic Party receiving the most seats in the cabinet from the 1946 general election, De Gasperi was able to continue his role as prime minister. James Miller, of the historical office for the U.S. Department of State, conducted a study of U.S. action leading up to the 1948 election in Italy. The resulting article provides a detailed account of their effect on the Italian government. Miller describes the De Gasperi 1946 government as an unstable coalition between the PCI, PSI, and the DC, with ideological conflicts creating deadlock on major reconstruction issues that ultimately stifled the recovery of the Italian economy.⁶⁷ Donald Sassoon believes the major reason the Italian economy was so slow to recover, despite U.S. economic stimulus, was due to the communist and the socialist parties' control of major positions inside the government. PSI and PCI leaders were appointed to the ministries of finance, trade, labor, and agriculture.⁶⁸ As a result of PSI and PCI efforts to impede economic recovery, the Italian population began blaming De Gasperi and his inability to govern as prime minister. The weak De Gasperi government and poor economic conditions led to increasing strikes and incidents of politically motivated violence in mass rallies and demonstrations.

The organized public unrest was most likely coordinated and instigated by the PSI and PCI; because of this subversion, the Christian Democrats were badly defeated in the November 1946 local elections in Rome.⁶⁹ If the Roman elections foreshadowed the future political landscape in Italy, the United States would need to increase its efforts to thwart a democratically elected communist or socialist government. To do so, it would need to identify an alternative party to support and develop strategies that would undermine communist and socialist influence.

⁶⁷ James E. Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," *Diplomatic History* 7, no. 1 (1983): 37, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1983.tb00381.x.

⁶⁸ Sassoon, *Contemporary Italy*, 18.

⁶⁹ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 37.

1. The Beginning of Overt Political Warfare

Walter Dowling, the Italian desk officer at the Department of State, noted the increased instability and urged the United States to abandon its hands-off approach in Italian internal affairs, recommending increased economic aid and overt political support for De Gasperi and his initiatives.⁷⁰ Heeding Dowling's warning, President Truman began an overt campaign to recognize Italy as a full member of the international community and invited De Gasperi to the United States for a ten-day, highly publicized conference. During De Gasperi's January 1947 visit, he conferred with the president and other top officials. These high-level engagements enabled the Italian government to receive a number of new aid grants and a \$100 million Export-Import Bank loan, which later proved ineffective due to deadlock in the Italian government.⁷¹

The overt, direct actions of the Department of State increased the attribution of opportunity for the DC, further legitimizing the De Gasperi government while also increasing the potential threat to PCI and PSI leadership. Grants and loans were directed at improving the economy through broad social-change processes linked to reconstruction and humanitarian aid. Together, the DOS engagement and economic-aid packages tried to alter the social construct by psychologically inducing Italians to favor U.S. backing over that of the Soviet Union. The use of overt public engagements and publicized economic relief programs illustrate how a third party can manipulate the social construct within a target to achieve strategic objectives.

In an effort to break the Italian deadlock, Secretary of State George C. Marshall increased pressure on the De Gasperi government, overtly suggesting that De Gasperi conduct radical reforms.⁷² On May 8, 1947, Marshall approved a memorandum that identified the Italian Communist Party (PCI) as a serious threat to American interests in the Mediterranean and suggested that a reform-minded, anti-Communist Italian government would be answered with the assurance of all possible U.S. aid and support.⁷³

⁷⁰ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 37.

⁷¹ Ibid., 37–38.

⁷² Ibid., 39–40.

⁷³ Ibid., 40.

On May 12, in response to Marshall's statement, De Gasperi resigned as prime minister and formed a new minority party government consisting of Christian Democrats, independent members of the Liberal Party (PLI), the Italian Social Movement Party (MSI), and the Monarchist National Party (PNM).⁷⁴

On June 2, the United States endorsed the new De Gasperi government and offered the Italian government an opportunity to participate in the American-financed program of European reconstruction known as the Marshall Plan.⁷⁵ Marshall's overt, direct statement presented opportunity and threat to the De Gasperi government. The attribution of opportunity was the U.S. guarantee of increased economic aid and full recognition in the international arena. Marshall's support was conditioned upon De Gasperi's ability to remove communist elements from the government. The attribution of threat was that if De Gasperi didn't expel the communists, the U.S. would guarantee that Italy would not receive Marshall Plan aid. Marshall's statements, followed by De Gasperi's innovative actions, decreased the political opportunity for the communists and socialists as members of the polity. De Gasperi's move to push the communists out of government forced the parties to act as non-polity members. As such, the Communist Party was able to act more aggressively in protest actions and threaten revolution, as the normal channels for resolving conflict in contained contention were no longer available. The PCI and PSI were now forced to engage in transgressive, contentious action.

Having been excluded, the PCI and PSI responded by implementing tactics for mobilizing the masses, including a series of strikes and political-agitation rallies intended to create heightened tension and compel the De Gasperi government to resign.⁷⁶ The Communist Party even resorted to threats of armed violence. Palmiro Togliatti, the party chief of the PCI, issued a statement at a September 7th Perma rally suggesting that the Communist party had a force of 30,000 armed men at its disposal. Togliatti threatened to use the militia against the De Gasperi government if the PCI was not reinstated as a full

⁷⁴ Sassoon, *Contemporary Italy*, 18–19; Mammarella, *Italy after Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965*, 145–149.

⁷⁵ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 40.

⁷⁶ Mammarella, *Italy after Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965*, 153.

member of the government.⁷⁷ The PSI and PCI, now acting outside the polity, implemented a series of claims that helped mobilize resources for collective action in the form of protests and armed violence. By mobilizing its base, the PSI and PCI sought to influence the future actions of the new Italian government. The threat of violent revolution was used as a bargaining tool in the event the PSI and PCI continued to be excluded from politics, despite their being legitimate political parties.

2. Overt, Covert Political Warfare

In response to the PCI and PSI threats, the United States began contingency planning for a possible Italian civil war and approved efforts to reinforce the De Gasperi government's legitimacy and security apparatus. The National Security Council recommended, through NSC 1/1, that the United States provide full support to De Gasperi through economic aid, including bread rations, additional credits and loans for reconstruction, improving the capabilities of internal security forces, and supporting major foreign-policy objectives of the Italian government; the use of armed forces, however, was ruled out.⁷⁸ De Gasperi called upon the United States to delay troop withdrawal until the last legally possible date of December 14, 1947.⁷⁹ The presence of U.S. military forces in Italy increased the attribution of threat toward a potential PSI- and PCI-organized coup. Even though NSC 1/1 ruled out direct military involvement in Italy, President Truman continued with an overt threat, issuing a public statement suggesting that the United States will react firmly to any use of force to overthrow the De Gasperi government.⁸⁰ With the U.S. military still present in Italy and American political backing of the De Gasperi ministry, President Truman, through the social construct, was able to increase the attribution of threat on PSI and PCI members using diplomatic, informational, and military means.

⁷⁷ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 40.

⁷⁸ National Security Council, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy," NSC 1/1 (Washington, DC: National Security Council, November 14, 1947), 724–726, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=div&did=FRUS.FRUS1948v03.i0015&isize=text>.

⁷⁹ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 43.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

To reinforce the president's statements, Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower recommended the CIA prepare a list of potential agents that could be used in covert operations within Italy to stifle a PSI and PCI coup.⁸¹ The covert preparation by the CIA in Italy would eventually evolve into a much larger covert operation in the 1950s, "Operation Gladio." Operation Gladio was an underground paramilitary organization established as a resistance and guerilla force that could be mobilized in the event of Soviet invasion or communist revolution.⁸² CIA actions were taken in preparation for covert, indirect intervention that would increase the attribution of political threat on the PCI through acts of sabotage and the mobilization of resources against the PCI.

The U.S. Army also increased the military supply program to the Italian internal security forces under De Gasperi's control. DOD actions improved De Gasperi's internal security-force capabilities against a potentially well-armed communist and socialist revolutionary movement. Additionally, the DOD proposed the mobilization of anti-communist Polish troops in the event of insurrection, as an alternative to U.S. direct intervention.⁸³ The efforts of the Army acted upon the fields of attribution of threat and opportunity, as well as organizational appropriation, by providing resources for mobilization. By increasing the capabilities of the internal security forces controlled by the De Gasperi government, they increased the attribution of a potential threat against the PCI and militant PSI protesters. Although never enacted, the use of Polish troops would be a covert, indirect action by the U.S. military to influence the attribution of threat for the PCI and militant PSI revolutionaries.

To decrease the potential for revolution, the Department of State overtly suggested that De Gasperi broaden his government to include the Republican and Social Democrats (PSLI). De Gasperi implemented the suggestion in December 1947.⁸⁴ The

⁸¹ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 43.

⁸² Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe*, Contemporary Security Studies (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 2, <http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119640.pdf>.

⁸³ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 44.

⁸⁴ Mammarella, *Italy After Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965*, 188.

inclusion of this party in the new government signaled an increased attribution of opportunity for political parties that did not espouse violence or militancy, while also decreasing the pretext for a communist coup by drawing away moderate supporters from the PSI into the PSLI. De Gasperi's actions, influenced by DOS suggestion, signaled a desire for cooperation and reform. Through the social construct, De Gasperi increased the attribution of opportunities within the Italian political space. The Department of State's suggestion was an overt, direct action that targeted the political-opportunity structure of the Italian government, with secondary impacts on the social construct and resources in social or organizational appropriation within Italy's political parties.

"The Vatican shared American apprehensions about a communist coup. With the encouragement of U.S. diplomats, the Vatican edged toward full participation in the anti-communist coalition."⁸⁵ The overt, indirect actions of the Department of State influenced the Catholic Church to develop a coalition against communism. By bringing the full support of the Church behind the DC political party, the Department of State had an indirect means to combat communist expansion. With the U.S.–Catholic Church coalition in effect, the archbishop of Milan, Cardinal Ildefonso Schuster, officially condemned communism, insisting that communism and Catholicism could not coexist in Italy. The Pope also ordered Catholic Action (CA) to break any communist-inspired general strikes, limiting the strikers' ability to stifle the Italian economy and decrease their political effectiveness.⁸⁶ Actions by the Department of State to influence the Church as a third party decreased the attribution of opportunity for the PCI. Department of State actions also affected the social construct by altering mindset of Italian Catholics toward communism. The United States was able to organizationally appropriate the Catholic Church to support its objectives.

By December 1947, political tension within Italy began to subside. Italian factions began focusing the majority of their efforts on the upcoming spring elections.⁸⁷ Despite U.S. overt intervention and the reorganization of De Gasperi's government, the

⁸⁵ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 44.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Mammarella, *Italy After Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965*, 188.

possibility of a peaceful communist takeover through the electoral process remained.⁸⁸ The PSI and PCI, capitalizing on their success in the general election of 1946, formed a single party under the name of the Popular Democratic Front.⁸⁹ By combining the two parties, the Popular Democratic Front had the potential to gain an electoral majority with 40% of the popular vote. If the 1946 voting statistics were any indication of how the 1948 election would turn out, 40% of the popular vote for the Popular Democratic Front could beat the Christian Democrats, who had received 35% in the last election. The merger of PSI and PCI, through organizational appropriation, increased the likelihood the communists would gain control. With the increased likelihood of a communist-led Italian government in 1948, the United States was forced to consider expanding its available options to counter the potential outcome.

C. EXPANDING POLITICAL WARFARE OPTIONS

In response to the growing threat of a communist takeover and increased possibility of civil war, the Department of Defense sent a Marine regimental combat team to reinforce naval forces in the Mediterranean.⁹⁰ This overt, direct act by the U.S. military increased the attribution of threats on the PCI, but also provided the PCI an opportunity to exploit this overt U.S. aggressive action by framing U.S. actions in anti-American, imperialist propaganda. The communist use of anti-American propaganda was an effective tool in manipulating the social construct. De Gasperi skillfully staved off the propaganda disaster by supporting the U.S. maneuver, insisting that it originated at the request of the Italian government. The Department of Defense learned to measure its overt acts of intervention against a potential public response.⁹¹ The Department of Defense would need to explore more indirect methods to gain leverage within Italy's political space.

⁸⁸ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 45.

⁸⁹ Mammarella, *Italy After Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965*, 189.

⁹⁰ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 45.

⁹¹ Ibid.

Revisiting the changing Italian situation, the National Security Council concluded that a coup was unlikely to occur until after the April elections.⁹² To strengthen De Gasperi's government, NSC 1/2 proposed increased economic aid, expediting the shipment of surplus military equipment to Italy, and a vigorous propaganda campaign to show American support for Italy's future. The council also suggested that the European Recovery Program be passed prior to the April elections.⁹³ The Department of State implemented NSC 1/2 suggestions by coordinating campaigns of economic aid with press releases designed to show the Italians that the United States was deeply concerned with their fate. In addition, the Department of State explored ways to encourage private U.S. groups and individuals to get involved in the Italian election. One measure was to secretly raise funds through U.S. business and organized labor groups to supplement the political campaigns of the Christian Democrats (DC) and Social Democrats (PSLI).⁹⁴ Part of the reason for the Department of State's indirect, covert actions was the lack of an established legal mechanism to transfer money directly to the DC or Social Democrat Party. The Department of State promotion of private contributions was an indirect measure that blurred the lines between overt and covert. The funds raised reinforced the field of resources for mobilization in organizational or social appropriation. The U.S. Department of State actions organizationally appropriated U.S. private business and labor unions to support the anti-communist effort in Italy.

The Vatican, satisfied with the American commitment to a crusade against communism, stepped up its own activities. In a public statement on February 22, 1948, the Vatican defined the election as a choice between communist atheism and Catholicism. The Pope then called on Catholic Action to mobilize the faithful to defeat the PCI and ordered the clergy to vote in the elections.⁹⁵ Vatican actions influenced the contentious politics mobilization model in the fields of social construct and resource

⁹² National Security Council, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy," NSC 1/2 (Washington, DC: National Security Council, February 10, 1948), 766, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=div&did=FRUS.FRUS1948v03.i0015&isize=text>.

⁹³ Ibid., 766–769.

⁹⁴ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 46.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

mobilization, through social and organizational appropriation of the Catholic community and organizations.

The De Gasperi government, with the backing of the United States and the Church, expanded its own effort to limit the threat of a communist coup. On February 2, the government banned all paramilitary organizations and enforced the ban through the police and other internal security-force action, using updated equipment from the Department of Defense.⁹⁶ Having the overt support of the United States and the Catholic Church enabled the De Gasperi government to act aggressively against communist militancy. Thus, an attribution of opportunity was afforded the De Gasperi government, through the overt action of the United States. Department of Defense supply programs were meanwhile aimed at increasing the capabilities of Italy's internal security, which enabled De Gasperi to mobilize his resources through organizational appropriation to combat communist militancy.

Although De Gasperi was using his resources to combat the threat, he was losing political support within the Italian population. The Department of State's attempts to raise private funds failed to give the DC and Social Democrats enough money to support their campaigns. The Popular Democratic Front (PDF) victories in the local elections in Pescara confirmed what polls predicted as a sweeping leftist victory in the upcoming April national elections.⁹⁷ More drastic measures were needed to legally support friendly political campaigns and more money was needed to organize greater public support for the DC and undermine the Popular Democratic Front.

1. NSC 1/3 Expanding Covert Political Warfare

On March 8, 1948 the National Security Council approved NSC 1/3, which authorized covert funding of the PSLI and the DC by the CIA's Office of Special Projects, initially under the supervision of the secretaries of state and defense. Secretary

⁹⁶ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 52.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 47.

of Defense Forrestal took charge of covert funding operations.⁹⁸ These CIA actions to fund political campaigns are classified as covert, direct actions that influenced the CPM model in the field of resource mobilization and organizational appropriation. Other CIA measures authorized by NSC 1/3 were the use of funds to covertly sponsor articles and political commentary in the media outlets of Italy and other countries to sway the social construct against the Communist Party. The CIA assisted in publishing books, periodicals, and brochures to combat communist ideology.⁹⁹ CIA actions in subsidizing articles and political commentary through third-party indigenous media outlets are classified as covert, indirect actions affecting the social construct.

Other measures proposed by NSC 1/3 included U.S. support of returning the Free Territory of Trieste to Italy and a private letter campaign from U.S. citizens and government officials directed at the Italian citizenry, highlighting the critical nature of the coming election.¹⁰⁰ Department of State support for returning Trieste was a direct, overt action that would change the social construct, broad social-change processes, and the attribution of opportunities for a DC-led government. The letter campaign was an overt, indirect action that specifically targeted the social construct with secondary effects in social appropriation.

In preparation for an Italian civil war, President Truman authorized the covert shipment of arms to Italy to support the anti-communist insurgency network and internal security forces.¹⁰¹ The shipment of military arms, much of which was already in the country at Department of Defense bases, directly affected the resources used for mobilization in organizational appropriation. Since the resources were directly supplied

⁹⁸ National Security Council, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means," NSC 1/3 (Washington, DC: National Security Council, March 8, 1948), 778, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=div&did=FRUS.FRUS1948v03.i0015&isize=text>.

⁹⁹ L. Britt Snider and Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.), *The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008), 260.

¹⁰⁰ National Security Council, "NSC 1/3," 778.

¹⁰¹ Truman, "President Truman to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)," March 10, 1948, 781, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=div&did=FRUS.FRUS1948v03.i0015&isize=text>.

to De Gasperi's security forces, the action was able to decrease the mobilization potential of the PCI and PSI paramilitary organizations by increasing attribution of threat in the CPM model threat and opportunity field. The action was also indirect, because some of the weapons were intended for the anti-communist insurgent network.

Truman expanded covert efforts to get U.S. corporations and labor unions with major investments in Italy to contribute secretly to the Social Democrats (PSLI). The CIA coordinated with Common Cause of New York City, a minority charity group with tax-exempt status, to channel government funds. Other funds were funneled to the DC by the U.S. government through a Swiss bank.¹⁰² Channeling funds through third parties is an action that is covert and indirect, changing the resources field of mobilization in organizational or social appropriation.

2. Political Warfare: Sprint to the Voting Line

On March 14, 1948 the Senate passed the European Recovery Program Act, followed by a vote in the House of Representatives ten days later. On April 2, 1948, President Truman signed the bill at a special ceremony designed to maximize impact on the social construct within Italy.¹⁰³ Passing the European Recovery Program Act, also known as the Marshall Plan, was an overt, direct action by the Department of State to influence broad social-change processes within Italy. At the time of its passing, it also influenced the attribution of opportunity and threat. A Christian Democrat Italian government saw the recovery act as an opportunity to improve DC's influence with the Italian people. The Communist Party, which opposed the act, perceived the Marshall Plan as a potential threat.

As the bill was being passed through the House and Senate, the Department of State and Marshall issued public statements that stipulated all American aid would be cut off in the event of a Communist Party victory in the next election.¹⁰⁴ The Department of Justice also attempted to influence Italians by applying a "1919 act to refuse immigration

¹⁰² Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 48.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

visas to anyone who belonged to the Communist Party and to expel any party members living in the United States.”¹⁰⁵ The statements of the Department of State and actions of the Department of Justice were intended to alter the social construct, which presented an opportunity for the DC or the PSLI and a threat for the Peoples Democratic Front (PDF), the PCI and PSI coalition.

The Department of State also transferred twenty-nine merchant ships to the Italian government in a special White House ceremony intended to show America’s support for Italy’s economic recovery and admiration for the new democracy.¹⁰⁶ Before the election, American propaganda in Italy intensified. Radio broadcasts and newsreels were produced, emphasizing the importance of Marshall Plan aid to Italian recovery. Emphasis was given to the fact that no communist nation was participating in the European Economic Recovery Program. Voice of America broadcasts to Italy increased, with interviews of prominent Italian-Americans and entertainers, who appealed to Italian voters to reject communism and highlighted the consequences Italy would face if the communists were allowed to gain power.¹⁰⁷ Other CIA black and gray propaganda efforts were conducted through Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.¹⁰⁸

These Department of State radio statements and public announcement were overt and direct, intended to act upon the Italian social construct to favor democracy over communism. Using influential public figures and entertainers was overt and indirect, also intended to affect the social construct. The CIA propaganda efforts through Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are classified as covert, direct actions, because both stations were entities established and run by U.S.-government organizations. CIA efforts to place articles and propaganda in local media were covert, indirect actions, since the CIA was using third parties to influence the social construct.

On March 20, 1948, the United States cemented a coalition with the British and French and issued a declaration on the status of the Free Territory of Trieste. The

¹⁰⁵ Miller, “Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948,” 48.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 49.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 50.

¹⁰⁸ Snider and Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.), *The Agency and the Hill*, 260.

declaration called for the entire region of Trieste to be returned to Italian jurisdiction. The coalition actions forced the Soviet Union to publicly announce its position on Trieste, in favor of Yugoslavia, a communist ally. The Soviet Union chose to denounce the declaration, which indicated to the Italian public that the Soviet Union was unwilling to support Italian interests.¹⁰⁹ The U.S. action to develop a coalition and issue a statement on Trieste was an indirect and overt action affecting broad social-change processes and the Italian social construct.

The Department of State arranged to have the British foreign office publicly invite a prominent Social Democratic trade unionist to London for a trade conference on labor participation within the European Recovery Program. During the conference, the foreign office was able to secure an Italian Labor Party public statement condemning the PSI for collaboration with the PCI.¹¹⁰ British actions, under the influence of the Department of State, were overt and indirect in influencing the attribution of opportunity for the PSLI while also shaping the social construct. The inclusion of the PSLI improved their ability to gain resources for mobilization through contracts they acquired from Marshall Plan funding. The PSLI's condemnation of the PSI presented a potential threat toward PSI leaders through the manipulation of the social construct. PSLI actions also hindered the PSI's ability to benefit from Marshall Plan contracts, affecting their ability to gain resources for mobilization. Finally, at the Department of State's request, the French and British agreed to entertain the Italian application for membership in the newly created European Union.¹¹¹ These American actions were overt and indirect, intended to influence broad social-change processes, the social construct, and the attribution of opportunity for a democratic Italian government and inclusion in the European Union.

As a result of U.S., Vatican, and other third-party efforts, the April 18, 1948, election outcome was a Popular Front (PCI/PSI) defeat. The coalition received 31.03 percent of the vote, with the Christian Democrats receiving 48.48 percent.¹¹² The United

¹⁰⁹ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 50.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Sassoon, *Contemporary Italy*, 167.

States touted the Italian Christian Democrat victory as a successful operation against communist expansion and used the experience gained as a template for developing Cold War strategies.

D. CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AREAS OF EVALUATION

In the Italian case there are multiple contentious episodes that could be used to evaluate the U.S. PW strategy in contained and transgressive action. In contained contention there was the DeGaspari's resignation as prime minister and his formation of a minority party government. DeGaspari's innovative action was in response to Marshall's statements of full Marshall Plan support if the PCI and PSI were removed from government. Other contained contention episodes included the local elections in Pescara and the national elections in 1948. The Pescara local election indicated the United States was losing ground in the PW effort to support the PDC. The U.S. adjusted its PW strategy with NSC 1/3 that expanded covert options in funding the PSLI and the DC as well as expanding the covert efforts to manipulate the social construct. The 1948 national elections results indicated the PW strategy was effective in limiting PSI and PCI influence in government.

The transgressive episodes of contention included the Italian security forces response to the PCI and PSI instigated public protests, riots, and demonstrations. When the parties were removed from government, the DOD effort to strengthen the DeGasperi security apparatus proved to be effective in limiting the PCI and PSI protester response and action. When the PCI indicated they had formed a 30,000 man revolutionary army, the DeGasperi government placed a ban on paramilitary organization. The DeGasperi government was able to enforce the ban through DOD's effort to improve the DeGasperi security apparatus.

Although this case analysis is not able to capture every U.S. action aimed at influencing the Italian political system, it examines each agency's actions and influence through the adapted CPM model. The next section examines the Italian political environment by identifying political parties, support groups, and coalitions. The tables following the Italian polity-model illustration in Figure 10 identify the individual efforts

of the Department of State, CIA, and Department of Defense. Each agency's actions are categorized in tables that combine the CPM model manipulation fields with types of action, whether overt, covert, direct, or indirect.




Figure 10. Italian Polity Model, 1948¹¹³

E. THE ITALIAN POLITY MODEL OF 1948

Figure 10 provides a visualization of the complex conditions in Italy's political environment. The polity model shows the support networks and coalitions that formed among parties within the government, the organizations that existed outside the government, and third-party influencers. The United States was able to build relationships in three key areas. The first was U.S. covert and overt coalitions developed

¹¹³ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*. Modified the Tilly polity model for political warfare by adding a distinction between the types of coalitions over/covert, cover, and overt.

with key party officials within the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party of Italian Workers. These coalitions allowed the United States, a third-party actor, to influence the Italian government directly, at the source.

The second key area was U.S. coalitions within the labor unions and other non-polity members. Coalitions outside the polity primarily supported key American coalitions within the polity. The United States supported non-polity member organizations that were backed by key leaders inside the polity, which helped reinforce the mobilization of important party officials in the coalition. The U.S. allocation of resources to the mobilization process of non-polity members enabled key coalition leaders within the polity to maintain power in government, increasing U.S. influence within the Italian political space.

The third key area of relationship building was with third-party entities. Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States developed coalitions with third party actors like the Catholic Church, which became instrumental in the 1948 election of the Christian Democrats. The Catholic Church had infrastructure and networks within the political space that the United States could leverage for support of the DC candidate. The Christian Democrats' social appropriation of the Catholic Action Support Network and infrastructure made the mobilization of Christian Democrats efficient and effective. Catholic Action provided valuable resources and voter support in critical elections and helped break the PSI- and PCI-orchestrated union strikes of 1947. The Americans' overt and covert relationship with the Catholic Church facilitated mobilization and helped substantiate and legitimize the elections.

The U.S. also used its influence with the United Kingdom to help the PSLI steal a key PSI voter base from the Popular Front coalition. The American use of third-party entities to influence the political space within Italy was a determining factor in the Soviet coalition's defeat.

The Italian polity model illustrates important differences between the political coalitions of the PSI, PCI, and the DC. The PSI and PCI were unable to generate a broad set of coalitions within the polity. By contrast, the Christian Democrats positioned

themselves as a central figure within the polity. By generating coalitions with other political parties, the Christian Democrats gained influence within the political establishment. The American use of the CIA and DOS to divide the PSI into two parties helped degrade the Popular Front network and strengthen the DC coalition within the polity. The PSLI offshoot of the PSI brought valuable resources from the labor unions Italian Labor Union (UIL) and Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) to the PSLI and DC coalition. The United States' use of PW tactics to split the Popular Front coalition helped undermine communist support of the Popular Front through appropriation of the trade unions. Dividing the PSI set the conditions for the Christian Democratic victory in 1948.

F. AN ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS IN ITALY

For purposes of analysis, this research tabulates and classifies the actions of the DOS, CIA, and DOD into four types: overt and direct; covert and direct; covert and indirect; and overt and indirect. The actions are organized according to where they affect the CPM model in the fields of broad social-change processes, attribution of political opportunity or threat, the social construct, and social/organizational appropriation for resources and mobilization. The CPM model represents the dynamic internal political environment for the target country. The classifications of PW action and how they influence the CPM model provide insights into the development of U.S. political warfare. By identifying how the United States uses its agencies and third-party actors to manipulate a target's political environment, and how each agency tends to focus its efforts, we can develop future PW strategies and identify areas for increased DOD involvement.

1. The Department of State

Department of State actions in Italy, categorized in Table 2, reveal that this agency is predominantly focused on overt, direct and overt, indirect actions. Overt, direct actions tend to affect the fields of broad social-change process, attribution of political opportunity or threats, and the social construct. Overt, indirect actions tend to affect the fields of attribution of political opportunity or threats, the social construct, and

social/organizational appropriation for resources and mobilization. Of the three Political Warfare agencies, the Department of State had the greatest effect on Italy's political environment post-WWII, most notably through broad social-change processes and attribution of political opportunity and threat. Its one covert, indirect action was the Department of State's prompting of private citizens to generate monetary contributions for the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Socialist Party of Italian Workers (PSLI). This use of covert, indirect methods occurred prior to any legal mechanisms for government funding of a foreign political party.

Another area greatly influencing the Italian political environment was the Department of State's use of overt, indirect actions. The Department of State used its relationships and influence with the Catholic Church and other nations to generate third-party actions favoring U.S. strategic interests in Italy. At the time, a formal diplomatic relationship with the Holy See was non-existence. However, unofficially, the Vatican cooperated overtly, with the Department of State, and covertly, with the CIA. The actions of the Catholic Church can therefore be considered influenced by overt and covert actions conducted by the DOS and CIA.

Table 2 presents actions performed by the Department of State in Italy in the years studied.

Table 2. Department of State Actions in Italy

<u>State Department Political Warfare Actions in Italy 1946-1948</u>	Broad Social Change Processes	Attribution of Political Opportunity or Threat	Social Construct	Social/Organizational Appropriation
Overt, Direct	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> January 1946 aid grants and \$100 Million export import bank loan Marshall Plan NSC 1/1 Economic Aid NSC 1 / 2 Economic Aid US Support of returning Trieste 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Truman's invitation to De Gasperi and the DC in Jan 1946 increased the attribution of Opportunity for DC supporters, increasing the political threat to the PSI and PCI Marshall's memorandum identifying the PCI as a threat to U.S. interest vowing all possible aid and support to a reformed minded anti-communist Italian government. Opportunity for DC Threat to PCI Acting on the increased Political Opportunity presented by Marshall's Memorandum De Gasperi resigned and formed new government without PSI and PCI representation. De Gasperi and the new government were quickly recognized by the U.S. as legitimate which then decreased the Political opportunity for PSI and PCI Truman's Public Statement, U.S. firm reaction to any use of force to overthrow De Gasperi Gov.- Threat to PSI PCI Suggested De Gasperi Broaden Government presenting opportunities for Republicans and Social Democratic Parties Because of U.S. support and security aid De Gasperi banned all Paramilitary organization and increased security enforcement to combat the communist threat US Support of Trieste return to Italy territory presented an opportunity for DC because the PCI could not get the Soviet Union to support the Trieste return Marshall Plan opportunity for DC threat for PCI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jan 1946 diplomatic conference in the U.S. legitimized the Italian Government by recognizing them as a full member in the International Community and an Allie of the US. Economic aid was used to show U.S. support to Italy and the lack of Soviet support Truman's Public Statement U.S. firm reaction to any use of force to overthrow De Gasperi Gov. Coordinating NSC 1 / 2 aid with press releases to show U.S. was deeply concerned with Italy's fait US support of returning Trieste showed the U.S. cared about Italy's future especially when the Soviet Union decided not to support Trieste's return to Italian control. State Department Public Statement indicating that if the Communist were to gain an Italian Victory all Marshall Plan aid would be cut off. Transfer of 29 merchant ships to show U.S. support of Italy economic recovery Voice of America Broadcasts and U.S. propaganda with prominent Italian Americans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transfer of 29 merchant ships to the Italian Government headed by De Gasperi.
Covert, Indirect				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secretly Encouraged U.S. private organizations and citizens to financially supplement the political campaign of the DC and PSLI
Overt, Indirect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> US forming a coalition with France and Britain to return Trieste to Italy control US Urged French and British to entertain the Italian application for membership in the European Union. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Catholic Church ordered Catholic Action to break communist inspired strikes decreasing opportunity for PSI and PCI mobilization US Urged the British to support the PSLI by inviting key PSLI trade union and political leaders to a British trade conference. The action by the British helped to legitimize the trade unions that support the PSLI creating political opportunity for the PSLI Membership in the European union presented an opportunity for a democratic Italian government. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> US suggestions to allow Republican and PSLI parties into government allowed De Gasperi to affect the social construct signaling a desire for cooperation and acceptance The U.S. Catholic Church anti-communist coalition allowed the Vatican to publically announce that Communism and Catholicism cannot coexist in Italy Satisfied with the Support against Communism the Vatican increases public statements to defeat communism. US letter campaign Use of prominent Italian Americans in Radio and Media Campaigns. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The U.S. Signal to allow the PSLI into government allowed moderate supporters of the PSI an alternative party to join decreasing the resource base of the PSI US Diplomats urged the Vatican to support an anti communist coalition, Vatican ordered clergy to vote in the '48 elections US letter campaign supported mobilization against PCI Inclusion of the PSLI trade unions in the British trade conference helped to gain resources for mobilization

2. Central Intelligence Agency

As outlined in Table 3, CIA actions remained predictably in the covert spectrum, from direct to indirect. CIA actions in Italy predominantly affected the social construct and organizational appropriation for resources and mobilization within the CPM model. The CIA had its greatest effects on the social construct through grey and black propaganda conducted through Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and subsidized articles and publications. The CIA's use of funds for bribes and campaign financing directly influenced the resources available within the supported organization. Supported parties and persons of influence used these resources to promote voting mobilization and other mass-mobilization efforts. The covert, direct actions of the CIA regarding the attribution of opportunity and threat were preparations for the stay-behind resistance network later known as the Gladio Brigades. It cannot be determined whether either the PCI or the PSI knew of the resistance network at the time. Had they known or perceived the potential for the emergence of such a group in the event of a communist coup, it would have increased their attribution of threat while decreasing the attribution of opportunity for the PCI. Other actions conducted by the CIA as to attribution of threat and opportunity included influencing the political elite to create opportunities for coalitions that would support the DC-led government. The CIA was able to gain influence with moderate leaders within the PSI that helped moderate leaders break away and assisted in the formation of a moderate PSLI party. CIA efforts to split the PSI created a threat to PSI and PCI leadership, causing them to lose valuable mobilization resources while creating opportunities for the PSLI to participate in the DC-led government before the 1948 elections. The PSLI took critical votes away from the PSI and PCI Democratic Front coalition and brought them to the PSLI; by splitting the PSI voter base, the CIA increased the likelihood that the DC would win a majority of the popular vote.

Table 3. Central Intelligence Agency Actions in Italy

<u>Central Intelligence Agency Political Warfare Actions in Italy 1946–1948</u>	Broad Social Change Processes	Attribution of Political Opportunity or Threat	Social Construct	Social/Organizational Appropriation
Overt Direct				
Covert-Direct		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIA initial establishment of the Gladio Brigade. If the PCI or the PSI knew of the potential existence of a resistance that would pose as a potential threat to revolutionary action by the PCI or PSI. • CIA support of the PSLI leaders presented an opportunity for the PSLI to be included in the De Gasperi Government threatening the PSI by splitting its mobilization resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radio Free Europe Broadcasts into Italy denouncing Communism and supporting the DC and PSLI • Radio Liberty Broadcasts Denouncing Communism and Supporting the DC and PSLI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIA helped to develop a breakoff political party from the PSI creating the more moderate PSLI • NSC 1/3 direct funding of the PSLI and DC members
Covert-Indirect			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NSC 1/3 covert funding of third party entities encouraging the placement of political commentary and articles in news media of other countries to favor U.S. point of view over communist ideologies. • NSC 1/3 Assisted in Publishing books, periodicals, and brochures to combat communist ideology. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIA organized a clandestine resistance force in the event of Soviet incursion or Communist Coup • Truman expanded efforts to get U.S. corporations with major investments in Italy along with trade unions to support and fund the political campaign of the PSLI • CIA coordinated with Common Cause a New York City Charity to channel government covert funds to the DC through a Swiss bank.
Overt Indirect				

3. Department of Defense

The Department of Defense actions summarized in Table 4 were predominantly overt, direct actions with a few covert, direct and covert, indirect actions. The Department of Defense tended to influence the CPM model in the fields of attribution of threat and opportunities, the social construct, and organizational appropriation for resources and mobilization. The DOD's covert, indirect efforts to organize the anti-communist Polish forces and the covert allocation of arms to anti-communist underground forces influenced the model in the fields of threat and opportunity and organizational appropriation for resources and mobilization, with limited effects on Italy's political environment. The Department of Defense was most effective at manipulating Italy's political environment through overt, direct actions that altered the attribution of political opportunity and threat before the end of WWII.

Having established the Allied Military Government and the Allied Control Command, the DOD injected itself directly into the Italian political space and steered the political environment to its own advantage, ensuring Italy would form a democracy. The DOD was an integral player in the drafting of Italy's constitution and ensured all political parties but the fascists were represented in the new government. The DOD knew the political environment, the political parties, and their bases of support through its connections with the Allied Military Government at the local level. Having been actively involved in local government, the Department of Defense was able to force the monarchy to accept the CLN, with all its parties, into the cabinet. The DOD also fired prominent political figures and substituted Italian politicians of its choosing. With the end of WWII and the turnover of Allied Military Government control to Italy's political establishment, the Department of Defense had a great effect on the resources allocated for the DC security forces in the area of organizational appropriation. The use of military resources to support the DC security apparatus had an indirect affect that affected the attribution of threat and opportunity. By reinforcing DC security forces, the Department of Defense increased the attribution of threat associated with the PSI-PCI coalition and created opportunities for the DC.

Table 4. Department of Defense Actions in Italy

<u>Department of Defense Political Warfare Activity in Italy 1943-48</u>	Broad Social Change Processes	Attribution of Political Opportunity or Threat	Social Construct	Social/Organizational Appropriation
Overt-Direct		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> US Maintained Military Presence at the request of the De Gasperi government to increase the Attribution of Threat on the PCI and PSI DOD sent a U.S. Marine regimental Combat Team to reinforce American Naval Forces in the Mediterranean increasing the threat to PCI and PSI plans for a coup Military threat to Italian political elite induced a coup to overthrow Mussolini in 1943 Under the Allied Military Government from 43–45, the U.S. was able to decide who would be placed in Italy's political positions and was able to influence the drafting of the Italy constitution Allied Military Government under General McFarlane threatened the political elite forcing Prime Minister Badoglio to resign and King Emanuel to give up his throne. Increasing De Gasperi Internal Security Forces Capabilities increased the Attribution of threat by the De Gasperi Government toward PSI and PCI mobilization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> US Military invasion of Italy affected the Italian Social construct helping them to question the actions of the Fascist Dictator Mussolini. US Military deployment of the Marine Combat team negatively affected the social construct within Italy due to skillful Communist Propaganda and Framing. 1947 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NSC 1/1 U.S. Army Increased the Military Aid to DeGasperi's Internal Security Forces. NSC 1 / 2 Increased Military and Security force Aid to De Gasperi Gov.
Covert-Direct				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Truman's Covert shipment of military arms to DeGasperi's security forces
Covert-Indirect				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Began Preparations for mobilizing anti-communist Polish troops in the event of insurrection. Truman's Covert shipment of Military Arms to anticommunist underground forces within Italy.
vert-Indirect				

G. CONCLUSION

This case study reviewed CIA, Department of State, and Department of Defense actions in Italy, classifying them as direct, indirect, covert, or overt, and illustrated how individual actions affected the CPM model in the fields of broad social-change processes, attribution of opportunities and threats, organizational or social appropriation for mobilization of resources, and manipulation of the social construct.

Department of State PW actions in Italy tended to have the greatest effect on the CPM model of Italy as the agency used various overt, direct, and indirect tactics after WWII. The CIA tended to be second in effectiveness, covertly influencing the social construct and resource-mobilization fields of the CPM model. The Department of Defense was most effective in manipulating the field of attribution of threat and opportunity through overt, direct action or indirectly through resource allocation in the field of organizational appropriation for mobilization. Indirectly, the Department of Defense provided the resources necessary for the Christian Democrats to mobilize their security apparatus and threaten Popular Front militancy and destabilization. The Department of Defense had its greatest impact on the Italian political space before the end of WWII in the Allied Military Government. DOD was able to set the conditions for a democratically elected constitutional democracy by promoting or demoting key parties and individuals in the early post-war government.

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V. CHILEAN CASE STUDY, 1961–1973

U.S. political warfare in Chile from 1961–1973 shows the expansion of the CIA's role in PW strategy and the nexus between U.S. corporate and government interests. As in the Italian case study, the primary goal in Chile was to stop a growing communist foothold in a U.S. sphere of influence. Unlike Italy, where CIA, DOS, and DOD actions complemented one another throughout the PW campaign, the Chilean case shows an alteration in U.S. strategy with the changes of the U.S. presidents. In 1961–1964, DOS, DOD, and CIA political warfare actions cooperated in preventing the Communist Party from controlling the government. After 1964, the Department of State decreased its involvement, allowing the CIA to take more control of PW actions. This strategy imbalance resulted in the Department of Defense's acting as the key enabler of the political warfare objective. This chapter highlights the U.S. strategy as it progressed from a complementary whole among the three agencies to a CIA-centered, covert-action strategy. U.S. actions are classified according to the covert, overt, direct, and indirect spectrum and where PW actions influenced the political space in the CPM model. This case study is organized differently than the Italian study due to the change in U.S. presidencies over the twelve-year period.

A. BACKGROUND

Having established a constitution in 1833, Chile, Latin America's oldest democracy, had a long-standing tradition of supporting peaceful democratic transitions of government. Since the 1930's, Chile had an active socialist and communist movement, with the communist party first getting elected to the Chilean Popular Front government in 1938. The Communist Party of Chile (PCCH), established in 1922, is the oldest and largest communist party in Latin America. The PCCH's close ties with the Soviet Union and communist organizations around the world enabled the PCCH to gain valuable

support and resources for organizing membership in the rapidly growing working-class unions of 1940s Chile.¹¹⁴

With the end of WWII and the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union intensified their interference in Chilean politics. In 1948, the Chilean Radical Party, partially in power because of its Popular Unity Front coalition with the Socialist Party and the PCCH, turned against its one-time ally, outlawing the Chilean Communist Party with the Law for the Defense of Democracy. The new Radical Party government, possibly under U.S. pressure, cited the revolutionary ideology, subversion, and militancy of the PCCH as a threat to order and stability.¹¹⁵ The PCCH, now outlawed, was forced into clandestine activities and further infiltrated the Chilean socialist parties and trade unions. The PCCH's close ties with the Socialist Party help build a strong relationship that would prove useful in future coalition governments.

The Communist Party would again become legal in 1958, when President Ibanez, a second-term independent, enacted reforms to increase the integrity of the electoral system. Re-legalized, the PCCH formed an enduring electoral alliance with the Socialist Party and presented a single candidate under a new coalition party of the Popular Action Front (FRAP). The PCCH, having been outlawed ten years, replaced the Popular Front politics of the 1940's with "worker front" politics, becoming more militant, exclusive, and radical in their ideology, especially after the 1959 Cuban revolution.¹¹⁶ The PCCH, now legally accepted, began an aggressive campaign to return to politics in the presidential election of 1958.

President Ibanez's policies of inclusion and voting reform also allowed the new Christian Democratic Party (DC) to gain support. President Ibanez reduced the power of landowners by improving the secret-ballot system, enforcing stiff fines for fraud, lowering the voting age, and eliminating voter-literacy requirements. Ibanez's actions facilitated the growth of political movements among the peasants, expanding political

¹¹⁴ Rex A. Hudson, ed., *Chile: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, 1994), countrystudies.us/chile/.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., Gabriel González Videla's Presidency, 1946–52.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., Ibáñez's Second Presidency, 1952–58.

opportunities for the PCCH and the DC.¹¹⁷ The Chilean Christian Democratic Party, founded in 1957 by merging three smaller conservative parties, capitalized on the Ibanez reforms and gained support from the middle class, women, peasants, and migrants.¹¹⁸ The Christian Democrats would become an integral party in countering the FRAP coalition in future Chilean elections.

The Chilean presidential election of 1958 surprised the United States in how rapidly the PCCH and the Socialist FRAP coalition had gained popular support.¹¹⁹ The United States was operating under the assumption that Chileans would vote as in 1952, when the Socialist Party, led by Salvador Allende, had only 5.5% of the popular vote. During the 1952 election, Ibanez, running as an independent, won a clear popular-vote majority of 46.8%. The Liberal Party candidate, Larrain, had 27% of the vote, and the Radical Party candidate, Barrios, took the remaining 20%.¹²⁰ It was assumed that the Socialist Party would have similar results in the 1958 election and that the majority of the popular vote would go to Jorge Alessandri, an independent and the son of two-time Chilean president Arturo Alessandri.

The 1958 election were very different. Approximately 32,000 votes separated the top two candidates. The Socialist party candidate, Salvador Allende, increased his share of the popular vote from 5.5% in 1952 to 28.9%, and Alessandri, the Independent Liberal Conservative candidate, received only 31.6% of the vote. The Christian Democratic candidate, Eduardo Frei, had 20.7%, and the Radical Party candidate had the remaining 15.6%.¹²¹ The close 1958 election led the U.S. to realize that if no external actions were taken, the 1964 Chilean presidential election could lead to a communist-run government.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., Ibanez's Second Presidency, 1952–58.

¹¹⁸ George W. Grayson Jr., "Chile's Christian Democratic Party: Power, Factions, and Ideology," *The Review of Politics* 31, no. 2 (April 1, 1969): 147, doi:10.2307/1406017.

¹¹⁹ Kristian Gustafson, *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974*, 1st ed (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 20.

¹²⁰ Dieter Nohlen, ed., *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 262.

¹²¹ Ibid.

With the election of President John Kennedy, the United States started increasing its political warfare efforts in Chile.

B. POLITICAL WARFARE UNDER KENNEDY, 1961–1964

President John Kennedy enacted a number of overt and covert policies to influence the political space of Chile in 1961–1964. Kennedy’s PW strategy provided a balanced approach to successfully counter a potential communist leader’s election. Kennedy’s PW strategy was not continued by subsequent administrations, however. This section analyzes Kennedy’s political warfare strategy using the developed frameworks.

1. Overt Political Warfare

President Kennedy implemented a number of overt direct and indirect PW actions using the Department of State and the military as key U.S. actors.

a. Social Construct

With the Eisenhower administration openly supporting military dictators in Peru, Paraguay, and Venezuela, and then-vice-president Richard Nixon praising Cuban autocrat Fulgencio Batista as the Cuban equivalent of Abraham Lincoln in 1955, it was not surprising that relations between Latin America and the United States had deteriorated by the time Kennedy took office in January 1961.¹²² His inaugural address tried to mend the U.S.–Latin American relationship with vows of support for freedom, democracy, and the end of poverty. It also sent an implied threat to any government contemplating interference in Latin American affairs.

To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge—to convert our good words into good deeds—in a new alliance for progress—to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every

¹²² “Alliance for Progress (Alianza Para El Progreso),” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 1, accessed May 18, 2015, <http://www.jfklibrary.org>.

other power know that this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.¹²³

Kennedy's Alliance for Progress was planned as a driving force to bring the Americas together. Kennedy believed that expanding trade, promoting foreign investment, increasing military support, and improving the conditions of the lower classes would counter the appeal of communism.¹²⁴ The goal of the Alliance for Progress was that no Latin American country fall into communist hands.

In his first year of taking office, Kennedy organized presidential receptions and Latin American conferences to promote the Alliance for Progress and reduce the communist furor after the Cuban revolution of 1959.¹²⁵ On March 13, 1961, Kennedy mentioned the Chilean government's call for sensible arms limitation in an Alliance for Progress proposal speech.¹²⁶ In August 1961, the Alliance for Progress became an official charter of the Americas, with all Latin American states and the United States as signatories—with Cuba the one exception.¹²⁷ The United States pledged \$20 billion in Latin American grant and loan investments over a ten-year period¹²⁸—an indication of administration's concern for Latin American affairs.

Kennedy made six public statements concerning the U.S.–Chilean relationship,¹²⁹ and his speeches, receptions, and conferences to promote the Alliance for Progress contributed overtly to the social construct of Latin American countries in promoting U.S. ties. Unlike the Marshall Plan in Italy, no presidential or Department of State addresses focused on a particular Latin American country. In the Marshall Plan, the Department of

¹²³ John Kennedy, "JFK Inaugural Address, 20 January 1961," .org, *John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum*, accessed March 19, 2015, www.jfklibrary.org.

¹²⁴ Gustafson, *Hostile Intent*, 25.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ "Address at White House Reception for Members of Congress and Latin American Republics' Diplomatic Corps, 13 March 1961" (Papers of John F. Kennedy, March 13, 1961), Speech Files, JFK Library, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-034-013.aspx>.

¹²⁷ "Alliance for Progress."

¹²⁸ Department of State, "Milestones: 1961–1968: Alliance for Progress and Peace Corps," Office of the Historian, accessed May 25, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/alliance-for-progress>.

¹²⁹ American Presidency Project, Presidential Public Statements (key word search "Chile") <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php>

State stipulated that all U.S. aid would stop if a communist government were elected to a potential recipient country. In the Alliance for Progress, the Department of State made no similar distinctions; there were plans to support even those governments facing communist revolution, which left the democratic election of Communist Party leaders open for interpretation. Unlike the Marshall Plan, the Alliance for Progress was framed as a humanitarian, social-reform program, rather than an economic stimulus and infrastructure-development program. This social-reform framework made it more difficult to put conditions on funding.

Much of Kennedy's initial success in Latin American public policy was overshadowed by the 1961 Bay of Pigs and 1962 Cuban Missile crises. Despite spending over a billion dollars in the first year alone, the Alliance for Progress and United States credibility as a disinterested actor in Latin America was undermined. "From the view point of the Latin American nationalist, the Alliance was never able to overcome its identification with Yankee Imperialism."¹³⁰ By 1970, not a single Latin American nation had committed itself to the comprehensive internal reforms and development programs originally intended by the alliance.¹³¹

b. Direct Broad Social Change

Soon after the Alliance for Progress's signing, the United States increased its foreign aid programs to Chile. "Of all the countries in the hemisphere, Chile was unofficially chosen to become the showcase for the new Alliance for Progress."¹³² Chile received more aid per capita than any other Latin American country.¹³³ "Kennedy wanted to show the world the capitalist model of third-world development worked better than the Marxist one."¹³⁴

¹³⁰ "Alliance for Progress," 2.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Frank Church and John Tower, "Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973," Staff Report, 94th Congress 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Senate, 1975), 4, <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94th/94chile.pdf>.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq*, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2006), 174.

Between 1961–1963, the Kennedy administration approved around \$420 million in U.S. economic aid to Chile. Compared to the \$301 million in U.S. economic aid in the eight years from 1953 to 1960, Chile received almost three times as much per year as it had before Kennedy’s election.¹³⁵ U.S. economic aid was intended to create broad social-change processes to align Chilean interests with those of the United States and weaken communist influence in the government and population. Alliance for Progress aid was not limited to economic stimulus and social reform; it was also used to gain greater influence over the Chilean military and security institutions.

c. *Organization Appropriation with Opportunities and Threats*

In 1962–1964, the Alliance for Progress and the administration drastically increased military aid to Chile. The Chilean military received an average of \$19.06 million per year, totaling over \$57.2 million. Compared to the earlier nine-year average of \$4.64 million, this three-year period brought a four-fold increase in military aid.¹³⁶ Coincidentally, much of the increase came in 1963, when there was an imminent threat that the PCCH would win the 1964 presidency.

In 1950–1969, the United States trained over 4,500 personnel in the Chilean military.¹³⁷ Most U.S. foreign military training from 1961 to 1969 was focused on anti-communist conditioning, counterinsurgency, and guerilla warfare.¹³⁸ The increase in DOD aid, coupled with the conditioning, may have been a major contributing factor in the Chilean military’s break from its apolitical tradition, to become more boisterous and politically active in elections.

The DOD’s use of training and military aid influenced the Chilean military’s social construct. By conditioning Chile’s military to be anti-communist, the United States

¹³⁵ Church and Tower, “Covert Action in Chile,” 34.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales And Other Security Cooperation Historical Facts*, Fiscal Year Series (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2013), 1132, http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/fiscal_year_series_-_30_september_2013.pdf.

¹³⁸ Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, 91st Congress 1st Session 91–17 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 120, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pcaaa242.pdf.

accomplished two goals. First, the anti-communist sentiment within Chile's military helped create an indirect threat to communist elements within the government. Second, it aided in organizationally appropriating Chile's military to promote U.S. interests. The United States thus gained a valuable ally within the government, one that could be used to create future political opportunities and threaten those who did not align with shared American-Chilean military interests. To further support the U.S. appropriation of Chile's military, the DOD provided resources for group mobilization with increased military funds, equipment sales, and leadership training.

2. Kennedy Administration Covert Political Warfare

In early 1961, the CIA started laying the groundwork for the 1964 presidential election. They first established operational relationships with key leaders in the political parties. They then started to formulate propaganda and the organizational mechanisms to influence key sectors of the population.¹³⁹ Many covert mechanisms had been in place since the 1950s, when the CIA developed relationships among peasants, slum dwellers, organized labor, student unions, and the media.¹⁴⁰

a. Organizational Appropriation

By March 1962, the U.S. Chilean ambassador, Charles Cole, along with special assistant to the president Richard Goodwin, proposed expanding covert action to counter the Communist Party in the 1964 presidential election.¹⁴¹ Two proposals were provided to the 5412 Special Group that began in 1954 as a planning and coordination body responsible for all U.S. covert programs.¹⁴² The first proposal requested support for the Christian Democratic Party, while the other recommended support for the Radical Party

¹³⁹ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 14.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ J.C. King, "245. Memorandum from Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division (King) to Director Central Intelligence McCone," January 3, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d245>.

¹⁴² U.S. Department of State, "Management of Covert Action in the Truman Presidency," U.S. Department of State: Office of the Historian, accessed May 27, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/actionsstatement>.

in the Democratic Front coalition.¹⁴³ Two non-attributable initial payments were authorized for the Christian Democrats, one in April 1962 for \$180,000 and another in August 1963. The Democratic Front (DF) coalition of the Radical Party received authorization for a one-time payment in December 1963 to supplement a \$500,000 campaign-expenses gap.¹⁴⁴

Through 1963, the U.S. could not decide which party or candidate to support in the 1964 presidential election: Julio Duran from the Radical Party in the Democratic Front coalition or Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei.¹⁴⁵ Part of the indecision was due to Kennedy's assassination on November 22, 1963. Once Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency, there was a brief pause in the oversight of covert planning and action, as those involved continued Kennedy's initial Chilean strategy. The Johnson administration was less committed to social reforms and the Alliance for Progress than was Kennedy and less concerned about Chilean politics, choosing to leave the decision making to the CIA and National Security Council.¹⁴⁶ In March 1964, the Democratic Front coalition was defeated in a pre-election and soon fell apart—a defeat that helped the U.S. Special Group decide which party to back. With the Democratic Front coalition no longer a viable contender for the presidency, U.S. agencies put their full support behind the Christian Democrats. The CIA continued to subsidize the Radical Party candidate, but only to support the Christian Democrat effort. By the 1964 election, the CIA had paid almost half of PDC campaign costs.¹⁴⁷

In addition to supporting political parties, the CIA also covertly supported private-citizen groups, slum dwellers, peasants, Masons, trade unions, the Roman Catholic Church, U.S. private organizations, student youth groups and dissident socialists.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 14.

¹⁴⁴ King, "Political Action Program in Chile."

¹⁴⁵ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 15.

¹⁴⁶ Gustafson, *Hostile Intent*, 42.

¹⁴⁷ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 15.

¹⁴⁸ Thomas Mann, "253. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for the Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State Rusk" (Office of the Historian, May 1, 1964), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxi/36308.htm>.

These groups were used to organize voter registration, place posters, and pass out leaflets to support the Christian Democrats or break up the Socialist and Communist coalition (FRAP) and bring voters to candidates other than Allende.¹⁴⁹ The covert, indirect funding of private groups supplemented the U.S. covert effort given to the Christian Democrats and none FRAP parties. U.S. covert efforts to socially appropriate groups outside of the polity helped mobilize voters for normal collective action process in contained contention. The citizen groups were also used to distribute propaganda to influence the social construct.

CIA direct and indirect funding of the Christian Democrats and the direct funding of the Radical Party had two impacts on the organizational-appropriation field and the political opportunity structure in the attribution opportunity and threat field of the CPM model. The first was made by providing resources with which groups could mobilize their support bases outside the polity, using media campaigns or buying voters so constituents would engage in collective action voting in contained contention on voting day. The indirect, non-attributable funding of the PDC supported the defeat of the FRAP coalition, but didn't afford the United States much influence over DC party leaders. Once covert, direct funding of the PDC was authorized in April 1964, the United States was better able to influence PDC leadership actions.

The second objective of funding was to facilitate a coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Radical Party or break up the FRAP coalition through political opportunities or bribery. By providing direct, covert funding to the Radical Party, the United States gained influence over Radical Party leaders. This influence could be used to create future coalitions and present political opportunities or threats. The CIA also supported the Radical Party as a way to change the social construct by "enhancing the Christian Democrats' image as a moderate progressive party being attacked from the right and the left."¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile."

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 15.

Multinational corporations with financial interests in Chile also offered to provide covert funding to defeat Allende. In May 1964, the Special Group turned down an offer of \$500,000 by American businessmen to assist in the covert funding of the anti-Allende campaign.¹⁵¹ Instead, the Special Group put the businessmen in contact with the embassy, which directed them to overt funding alternatives. The 1964 connection between private business and the CIA would play a larger role in future Chilean elections.

b. The Social Construct

While support was given to political parties, the CIA and the United States Information Agency (USIA), under the Department of State, engaged in a massive direct and indirect anti-communist propaganda campaign. The CIA and USIA used the press, radio, films, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, direct mailings, paper streamers, and wall paintings to influence Chile's social construct.¹⁵² The CIA also employed covert, direct methods of disinformation and black propaganda in some of its influence messaging.¹⁵³ The CIA tended to focus on radio and news media, whereas the USIA produced leaflets, posters, films, and direct mailings.¹⁵⁴ Both agencies concealed their involvement.

The U.S. Senate Church report, that evaluated U.S. covert involvement in Chilean politics from 1964–1973, describes the CIA and USIA propaganda campaign as “enormous.” In the final week of June 1964, two months before the election, both agencies intensified their activities. The CIA funded twenty radio spots per day on Santiago and 44 provincial stations. Twelve-minute news broadcasts were funded five times a day on three Santiago radio stations and on 24 provincial radio outlets. Thousands of cartoons and paid press advertising were printed in newspapers and magazines with

¹⁵¹ Jessup, “257. Memorandum for the Record” (Office of the Historian, May 12, 1964), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxi/36308.htm>.

¹⁵² Mann, “Presidential Election in Chile.”

¹⁵³ Church and Tower, “Covert Action in Chile,” 15.

¹⁵⁴ Gustafson, *Hostile Intent*, 43.

3,000 posters distributed daily. In the television media, the group produced 24 daily newscasts in Santiago, and the provinces, 26 weekly commentary programs.¹⁵⁵

The Church report also calls attention to the CIA and USIA's efforts in 1964 to leverage international support. The Roman Catholic Church generated an anti-communist pastoral letter from Pope Pius XI, with hundreds of thousands of copies printed to distribute in support of the Christian Democrat campaign.¹⁵⁶ Articles against communism from abroad were replayed in Chile's new media. Newspapers reported endorsements of Eduardo Frei by the sister of a Latin American leader, a public letter from a former president in exile, and a message from the women of Venezuela. Various Latin America military government leaders also shared dire warnings about an Allende victory.¹⁵⁷ To affect Chile's social construct, almost all of these covert propaganda measures were conducted indirectly. The CIA and USIA generated most of the propaganda content, but used intermediaries to disseminate the information to hide or obfuscate U.S. involvement. The propaganda in the 1964 election used framing to identify the problem of a communist government in Chile, provided a solution in a Christian Democratic-led government, and issued a call to voter action.

c. Political Opportunity and Threat

The CIA took measures within the political opportunity structure of the CPM model field of opportunities and threats. In a memorandum prepared for the special group entitled "Support for the Chilean Presidential Elections of 4 September 1964," the CIA outlined four of eight objectives aimed at influencing the political opportunity structure.

1. Bring pressure to bear on the Radical Party to prevent it from formally endorsing Allende, or, failing in this, to remain neutral or to run its own candidate if it appears that he will not damage Frei. In the event the Radical Party declares for Allende, financial assistance will have to be provided to individual Radical leaders or groups capable of bringing Radical voters into the Frei camp.

¹⁵⁵ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 16.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 15.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 16.

2. To influence the Conservative and Liberal parties to support Frei in a manner that will not damage his image as a reform candidate. To achieve this it will be necessary to provide financial assistance to the Liberal and Conservative parties or those of their leaders who will work to swing their votes behind Frei.
3. Provide a substantial subsidy [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] for the purpose of strengthening his electoral machine and campaign capabilities. Efforts will also be made to influence Frei to reach a private agreement with the Radicals for their support in exchange for some patronage.
4. Bring pressure to bear on Jorge Prat, partly through Conservative and Liberal leaders, to induce his withdrawal from the presidential contest.¹⁵⁸

The CIA's main effort in manipulating the political opportunity structure was through financial means—using bribes or threats to cut off funding to political leaders. The CIA used funds and influence over party leaders to create political opportunities for the Christian Democrats in developing coalitions with other parties. Other measures used financial means to break up the FRAP coalition or buy PDC votes within the congress in the event of a close election. These CIA payments to gain influence over key leaders are an example of a direct, covert action.

3. Contentious Politics Evaluation Area

All these overt and covert, direct and indirect efforts culminated in a single contained, contentious event: the September 1964 presidential election. The election fielded three candidates—Eduardo Frei from the Christian Democrats, Salvador Allende from the FRAP coalition, and Julio Duran from the Radical Party. The election resulted in Frei's receiving 56 percent of the vote, Allende, 39 percent, and Duran, nine percent. Applying the CPM model to the dynamic interaction involved, the election results led the losing parties to increase their level of uncertainty, making them more susceptible to future opportunities or threats in the new PDC-led government. With a clear majority going to the PDC candidate, the area of evaluation shows that the U.S. political warfare strategy achieved its objective. The threat of a communist-led government in Chile was

¹⁵⁸ CIA, "Support for the Chilean Presidential Election of Sept 1964," *In FRUS 1964-68*, memorandum to Special Group, vol. 31 (April 1, 1964): doc. 250.

forestalled. The U.S. had now to prepare for future contentious episodes under the Johnson administration.

C. POLITICAL WARFARE IN CHILE UNDER JOHNSON, 1964–1969

Although President Johnson assumed office in November 1963, he did not really begin to be active in Chilean politics or political warfare until after Chile's 1964 election, having let the CIA and the National Security Council make political decisions on Chile.¹⁵⁹ During Johnson's term in office, two minor operations were aimed at actively manipulating Chile's political space, none of which came close to the effort Kennedy had put forward.

1. Overt Political Warfare

There were few overt actions under Johnson; the administration's Chilean policy followed what the Kennedy administration had established, although with less intensity and concern.

a. Social Construct

The day following Chile's 1964 presidential election, Johnson held a news conference in which he congratulated the new president, Eduardo Frei, stating "he looks forward to cooperating with the newly selected leader.... to work for the economic and social development of his country within a democratic framework which emphasis personal liberty."¹⁶⁰ Johnson reinforced the notion that the election results were a product of "an internal matter in which people of Chile were the only judges of the issues. The election reminds us once more... of the strength of democracy in Chile and throughout the Western Hemisphere.... reinforcing our hopes for a very bright future in the Americas."¹⁶¹ By publicly endorsing Eduardo Frei, Johnson was influencing the social

¹⁵⁹ Gustafson, *Hostile Intent*, 42.

¹⁶⁰ Lyndon Johnson, "Lyndon B. Johnson-560 the President's News Conference September 5, 1964," .edu, *Presidency.ucsb.edu*, (September 5, 1964), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26488>.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*.

construct of Chile's populace. Johnson's statement reinforcing democratic frameworks and personal liberty spoke directly to the communists in Chile.

Johnson's September press conference also recognized the Alliance for Progress as a contributing factor in advancing democracy and social and economic development.¹⁶² His endorsement of the alliance indicated that the administration would continue its commitment to Latin America and reinforced the social construct trying to gain U.S. favor over communism. In an October 2014 public statement, Johnson indicated that communism was on the run in Chile and Brazil.¹⁶³ Johnson's statements continue to remind Chileans of U.S. concern.

In January 1965, President Johnson's level of commitment toward Latin America was revealed as he indicated he would not provide additional development lending for the Alliance for Progress.¹⁶⁴ By disapproving funding in favor of increased funding for Vietnam, the President signaled a decrease in concern about Latin American affairs. Although Alliance for Progress aid continued, Johnson addressed few concerns regarding Chile and the Alliance for Progress in his public speeches.

President Johnson made two public statements concerning the Chilean people: a note of sympathy after a disastrous flood in 1965 and a welcome of Eduardo Frei to the White House.¹⁶⁵ In comparison with Kennedy's public statements from 1961 to 1963, Johnson seemed but little concerned with Chile.

b. Broad Social Change

The Alliance for Progress initiative in Latin America continued throughout the Johnson administration. Despite Johnson's focus on Vietnam and hands-off approach to Latin America, 1965–1969 brought over \$680.6 million in U.S. economic aid to Chile—

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Lyndon Johnson, "Remarks in Springfield, Ill, at the Sangamon County Courthouse," The American Presidency Project, October 7, 1964, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26571&st=Chile&st1=>.

¹⁶⁴ Lyndon Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid." (The American Presidency Project, January 14, 1965), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26885&st=Chile&st1=>.

¹⁶⁵ American Presidency Project, Presidential Public Statements (key word search "Chile") <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php>

around \$65 million more per year in economic aid than the \$420 million under Kennedy.¹⁶⁶ The Johnson administration failed to communicate with and exploit the Alliance for Progress program in Chile. Little effort was given to overtly affect Chile's social construct using public statements specifically directed to the population. The Kennedy administration was vocal about its commitment to Chile. Under the Marshall Plan, President Truman's administration made many overt efforts to address the Italian population. One of the failures of the Alliance for Progress may be that not enough effort was given to communicate America's commitment to Chile.

Between 1962 and 1969, Chile received more than \$1.2 billion in aid, loans, and grants.¹⁶⁷ Much of the aid given through the Alliance for Progress was aimed at creating broad social-change processes through the redistribution of wealth, using economic stimulus and government reform to combat communist influences in the underprivileged classes of Latin America. This strategy, however, did not bear fruit. Despite the Alliance for Progress's lofty goals "only two percent of economic growth in 1960s Latin America directly benefited the poor."¹⁶⁸ A large percentage of Alliance for Progress money for investment found its way back to the United States, ultimately benefiting American business.¹⁶⁹

c. Organizational Appropriation

Under the Johnson administration, Department of Defense aid continued, but decreased sharply after Chile's 1964 election. Over a four-year period, Department of Defense aid went from a \$19.2 million average under Kennedy to a \$10.9 million average under Johnson. The Department of Defense continued training about a hundred military service members from Chile per year, increasing the numbers trained in 1968 and 1969. As in the Kennedy administration, the United States used military aid and training to

¹⁶⁶ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 34.

¹⁶⁷ Kinzer, *Overthrow*, 174.

¹⁶⁸ Department of State, "Alliance for Progress."

¹⁶⁹ William Ascher, Ann Hubbard, and International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development, *Central American Recovery and Development: Task Force Report to the International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development* (London: Duke University Press, 1989), 352–353.

influence Chile's military leaders to favor U.S. interests and reject communism. The overt, direct military funding continued the strong relationship between the Department of Defense and the Chilean military.

2. Covert Political Warfare

After the election of 1964, the scope of covert activities in Chile went back to a steady state. Between 1965 and 1969, the CIA spent around \$2 million on covert action, primarily anti-communism propaganda and on two minor political efforts—a congressional election in 1965 and a slightly larger effort in the congressional elections of 1969.¹⁷⁰

a. *The Social Construct*

From 1965–1969, almost half of \$2 million spent on covert action was aimed at influencing Chile's social construct. The CIA funded a rightwing weekly newspaper that regularly attacked Allende, the PCCH, and communism. The CIA continued to persuade the Chilean wire services to place editorial and news stories that supported the PDC, condemned communism, and hid damaging stories about the United States.. Other efforts supported anti-communist propaganda through wall posters, leaflet campaigns, and public heckling.¹⁷¹ The CIA produced radio political-commentary shows attacking political parties on the left and supporting CIA-selected candidates.¹⁷² Much of the CIA's effort to shape the social construct focused on anti-communism or anti-Allende messaging, leaving a gap in frame messaging. The propaganda identified the problem as communism and Allende, but failed to identify a solution. None of the mass propaganda efforts supported a particular party or candidate leading up the presidential election of 1970.

¹⁷⁰ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 18.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 18–19.

¹⁷² Ibid.

b. Opportunity and Threat

To support President Frei and oppose communist influence in Chile, the CIA influenced two congressional elections to strengthen the Christian Democratic party and weaken the PCCH. In February 1965, the 303 Committee (the successor of the 5412 Special Group) approved \$175,000 for a short-term political-action project that provided covert support to selected candidates in the March 1965 congressional elections in Chile. The CIA and the ambassador selected twenty-two candidates to support with covert funds. Nine candidates were actually elected. The CIA claimed the operation helped defeat around thirteen FRAP candidates they believed would have otherwise won congressional seats. In 1967, the CIA spent \$30,000 to strengthen a rightwing element of the Radical Party.¹⁷³

A second effort was authorized in July 1968, to prepare for the congressional election of March 1969. This covert project authorized \$350,000 to strengthen the moderate political parties in the congress in advance of the 1970 presidential election. The money supported PDC, non-Marxist radicals, and National Party candidates, along with a splinter party from Allende's FRAP coalition.¹⁷⁴ The CIA also tried to influence key Socialist Party (PS) leaders in the FRAP coalition to bring them to a European style of socialism, rather than a communist form.¹⁷⁵ The CIA provided the socialist party splinter group with almost half its campaign budget.¹⁷⁶ CIA funds targeted the leadership of the political parties to create political opportunities for the PDC in future elections and decrease the Communist Party influence in government.

c. Social or Organizational Appropriation

From 1965–1969, many CIA efforts to appropriate Chile's organizational or social groups for mobilization in future elections were unsuccessful. The CIA attempted to organize the urban poor of Santiago to compete with Marxist groups, but terminated its

¹⁷³ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 18.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Gustafson, *Hostile Intent*, 67.

support in 1969 because the group's leader was unwilling to deliver large-scale votes in the 1969 congressional and 1970 presidential elections. CIA efforts to organize anti-communist slum dwellers, peasants, and social groups were terminated after CIA funding was exposed in 1967.¹⁷⁷

The Church Report describes four organizational projects that worked during this period. One funded an anti-communist women's group active in Chilean politics and intellectual life; another funded organized labor groups. One project organized a democratic labor union to combat the communist-dominated Central Unica De Trabajadores Chilenos (CUTCh) and the other supported a Catholic labor field.¹⁷⁸ The fourth effort funded a protest march against the Soviet Embassy after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.¹⁷⁹ Through funding, the CIA was able to socially or organizationally appropriate Chilean social groups for mobilization in elections. The public exposure of CIA efforts to organize voters against the PCCH influenced the social construct, undermining the legitimacy of the PDC and other moderate and rightwing parties.

3. Contentious Politics Evaluation Area

From 1965–1969, the United States influenced three mobilization efforts that could have been used for evaluation of the PW effort. Two of these focused on the congressional elections of 1965 and 1969. The third was an organized protest against the Soviet Embassy. The protest demonstrated how the Chilean governmental security apparatus would react to political mobilization in transgressive contention. The protest led to a major police action and mass media coverage.¹⁸⁰

The results from the two elections provided an indication of how well U.S. political warfare efforts were achieving the objective in contained contention. The 1965 congressional election strengthened PDC support within the chamber of deputies and senate. In the chamber of deputies, the PDC gained fifty-nine seats, and nine seats were

¹⁷⁷ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 18.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 19.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

added in the Senate. The communist and socialist parties were the only other political parties to gain seats in the chamber of deputies. In the senate, the Communist Party was the only party to gain seats with the PDC.¹⁸¹ Much of the PDC's success in the 1965 election resulted from the propaganda and organization efforts of the 1964 presidential campaign. This political environment was to change.

In 1969, congressional election results seemed to indicate the socialist and communist parties were gaining support in the population. The PDC still remained dominant; however they lost twenty-six seats in the chamber of deputies, ceding twenty-four to the National Party and another eight to the communist and socialist parties. Within the Senate, the PDC and the Communist Party (PCCH) were the only two parties to gain seats. The PDC gained ten and the PCCH gained two.¹⁸² The CIA supported only twelve candidates in the 1969 election, with only ten elected. Considering the PDC's major loss in the chamber, the U.S. political warfare efforts leading up to 1969 were not enough to prevent the communists from gaining power in the 1970 presidential election.

D. POLITICAL WARFARE UNDER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, 1969–1973

The Nixon administration approached political warfare in Chile with apprehension at first, which grew in the latter half of 1970 into a political warfare panic. Under the Nixon administration, the CIA increased its PW relationship with private corporations, and the administration circumvented the conventional coordination between the Department of State and the CIA by directing some CIA actions without Department of State knowledge.

1. Overt Political Warfare

The Nixon administration disengaged from Latin America when first taking office. The new 40 Committee (the successor of the 303 Committee) was reluctant to approve any Chilean PW programs prior to the 1970 presidential election. No clear direction was given as to how to proceed in Chilean affairs, and Nixon gave few public

¹⁸¹ Nohlen, *Elections in the Americas*, 262.

¹⁸² Ibid.

statements on Chile and the Latin American people. The administration ended the Alliance for Progress, focusing on promoting trade rather than aid. After Chile's 1970 election of Allende, the Nixon administration became more vocal about Chilean affairs.

a. Social Construct

On October 31, 1969, the Nixon Administration announced the end of the Alliance for Progress at an annual meeting of the Inter American Press Association. During the meeting, Nixon called for the end to foreign aid and a return to economic trade. He termed the new program "action for progress," implying the United States would take a more programmatic approach to Latin American affairs and assist those governments that took action for reform and development, rather than give aid in hopes of inducing change.¹⁸³ Nixon's remarks were cautious toward Latin America and lacked the inspiration and hope of the Kennedy administration. This pragmatic view of Latin America and Chile might have been a factor in Allende's presidential victory of 1970.

The Nixon administration did not mention Chilean affairs again until after Allende took office. On January 4, 1971, Nixon mentioned Chile in an interview with television networks. During the interview, President Nixon was asked if he felt responsible for Chile's democracy falling to communism. Nixon responded:

What happened in Chile is not something that we welcomed... although we were very careful to point out the... decision was of the people of Chile...we accept that decision and...we still recognize the government... as far as what happened in Chile... we can only say that for the United States to have intervened... in a free election and to have turned it around, I think, would have had repercussions all over Latin America...far worse than what has happened in Chile.¹⁸⁴

The President would again answer questions about Chile in an April 16 interview in which Cuban and Chilean-American relations were discussed.

¹⁸³ Richard Nixon, "Remarks at The Annual Meeting of the Inter American Press Association." October 31, 1969, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2302&st=Chile&st1=>.

¹⁸⁴ Richard Nixon, "A Conversation with the President," Interview with Four Representatives of Television Networks, Television, January 4, 1971, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3307&st=Chile&st1=>.

Chile has what is termed a Communist leaning government, at least. We will call it a Marxist government. Allende is a Marxist, with strong Communist support. As far as Chile is concerned, we don't particularly approve of that type of government. We wouldn't want it here. On the other hand, the Chilean people voted for it. So, as far as our attitude toward Chile is concerned, it will be affected by what Chile's attitude is toward us.

If the Chilean Government does some things internally, that is their business and the business of the Chilean people. They voted the government in, and they will have to live with it. If, however, they do things in Chile or outside of Chile in their foreign policy that is detrimental to us, then that is our business, and we will react accordingly. We are waiting to see what they will do. As long as they treat us properly we will treat them properly.¹⁸⁵

Both interviews indicated the United States had an overt, hands-off approach to Chile. Chilean affairs, as far as the public was concerned, were for the people of Chile to decide. The president did not speak of Chile again until after the military coup that overthrew the Allende government.

b. Broad Social Change

With the end of the Alliance for Progress, economic aid decreased sharply from 1969 to 1973. In 1969, economic aid was at \$80.8 million. In 1970, economic aid decreased to \$29.6 million. Another sharp decrease occurred in 1971, to \$8.6 million, and again in 1973 to a low of \$3.8 million.¹⁸⁶ From 1962–1969, the Chilean economy had become reliant on over \$100 million dollars a year in economic stimulus. By decreasing economic aid to Chile in a short time, Nixon was overtly acting to impede the Chilean economy, affecting broad social-change processes to encourage conditions for change in the political-opportunity structure of Chile.

The Department of State and other U.S. agencies used their influence within the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and other international financial institutions to limit the amount of credit and loans given to the Chilean government under

¹⁸⁵ Richard Nixon, Panel Interview at the Annual Convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1971, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2982&st=Chile&st1=>.

¹⁸⁶ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 34.

Allende. Without financial backing and government credit, Allende was not able to sustain the basic governmental services usually provided to the population. To gain more revenue, the Allende government increased taxes on the major private industries in Chile. Allende then nationalized the copper and steel industries to use their revenues to cover government spending. In appropriating the private industry, Allende set off a chain reaction that would lead to the economic collapse of Chile and a military coup in 1973.

c. Organizational appropriation

In 1970, the Nixon administration shocked the Chilean military establishment by decreasing U.S. military aid from \$11.8 million in 1969 to \$800,000 in 1970. After Allende's election, the United States increased military aid and training to maintain influence over the Chilean military. In 1971, military aid increased to \$5.7 million, followed by increases in 1972 and 1973 to \$12.3 and \$15 million, respectively.¹⁸⁷ The Department of Defense also increased the number of Chilean military students trained in Panama. Beginning in 1970, the number of trained almost doubled, to around two hundred a year, and continued to increase through 1974.¹⁸⁸ The Kennedy and Johnson administration's use of the DOD to overtly organizationally-appropriate Chile's military through military aid and training helped set the conditions for the coup of 1973.

2. Covert Political Warfare

The Nixon administration conducted a number of covert operations between 1970–1973 and spent approximately \$7 million to support Allende-opposition groups. The administration tried three primary efforts. One was a “spoiling operation” to influence the 1970 presidential election. The operation attempted to undermine communist efforts to bring about a coalition among leftwing parties in congress, with other effort to strengthening non-Marxist political parties and leaders.¹⁸⁹ After the election of Allende, the CIA constructed two covert campaigns. Track I was an attempt to manipulate the presidential-confirmation vote, with Track II exploring options for a

¹⁸⁷Church and Tower, “Covert Action in Chile,” 34.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 38.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 21.

military coup. To support both operations, the CIA increased its relationship with private business to help set the conditions for political change.

a. Social Construct

Many of the same efforts developed to disseminate and generate propaganda in 1964 were used again during the 1970 election. Hundreds of thousands of high quality picture books, posters, and leaflets were printed. Radio propaganda, editorials, political features, and news articles were produced for print and radio using three different news services. Newsletters were mailed to two thousand journalists, academics, politicians, and opinion makers. All the propaganda was focused on a scare campaign against communism. Black propaganda was also used to sow dissent among the communist and socialist parties and splinter the communist and socialist labor union CUTCh¹⁹⁰

One difference between the propaganda produced for the 1970 election and that of the 1964 election was that the 1970 propaganda pointed out the problem with communism, but nothing was produced that identified a solution in electing a particular party. The 40 Committee decided not to support any one political party during the election so the propaganda couldn't be framed like the propaganda used in the 1964 election, which pointed to the PDC as the party solution to communism. After Allende was elected, almost all of the media and propaganda assets the CIA had developed from 1964 to 1970 left the country. They had become so visible and vocal against Allende during the campaign; they feared he would take action against them.

With most of the CIA indirect-propaganda machine gone, the CIA became limited in its ability to affect the social construct and had to redevelop its propaganda machine. CIA agent journalists from ten countries were flown to Chile to provide on-the-scene reporting. After the election, the CIA generated a propaganda campaign to influence the upcoming congressional vote that would decide the close election. The propaganda focus was to create concern for Chile's future, and it was specifically designed to influence Frei, the elite, and the military.¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 22.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 24.

To implement the campaign leading up to the congressional vote, the CIA used its only remaining major propaganda outlet, *El Mercurio*, a major Santiago newspaper. *El Mercurio* couldn't do the propaganda job the CIA needed, so the CIA used its assets in other Latin American countries to generate foreign news stories about Chile's situation. The CIA also developed its own resources by funding an underground press, financing small newspapers, radio programs, political advertisements, rallies, and the direct mailing of foreign news articles to Frei, his wife, selected leaders, and the Chilean domestic press.¹⁹² The CIA propaganda campaign failed to influence Frei or the outcome of the congressional vote. Allende was confirmed as president on November 1, 1970.

The propaganda campaign continued throughout the Allende presidency. From 1970–1973, the CIA spent \$1.5 to keep *El Mercurio* in business and producing anti-Allende propaganda. In 1971, the CIA helped the PDC and PN purchase its own radio stations and newspapers with CIA money.¹⁹³ The addition of these party-run assets helped the CIA rebuild its propaganda machine during Allende's presidency. The CIA also funded an anti-government news pamphlet directed at the armed services and used the pamphlet to pass black propaganda or fabricated information that would prompt a military coup. Other black-propaganda efforts included passing Chile's military and police officials fabricated documents indicating an Allende connection with Cuba, and plans to arrest or kill senior military officials. In covertly targeting the military, the CIA manipulated their social construct to induce a coup.

The primary propaganda focus during the Allende years was to polarize Chile's population, create the conditions for a military coup, and ensure freedom of the press. The same propaganda methods were used during the Allende presidency as in previous propaganda campaigns, with more focus on involving the international media. The CIA also funded opposition-research organizations that drafted many legal bills in Chile's congress. According to CIA documents, CIA propaganda from 1970–1973 played a significant role in setting the stage for the military coup of September 11, 1973.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 24.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

b. Organizational or Social Appropriation

Unlike the 1964 election, the 1970 election did not have CIA-funded public opinion polls, grassroots organizing, voter registration, and community development. Little effort was made to support organizational appropriation for the mobilization of voters. The CIA's one effort was the funding of the Radical Party campaign, so that radical party leaders would shore up its left-leaning members to reduce potential voters for Allende.

Without CIA funding of any particular political party in 1970, private business tried to assist. Harold Geneen, of the International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation (ITT), approached the CIA with a proposal to make private funds available in the campaigns of Alessandri and the National Party. The CIA declined to channel the funds directly, but did provide them a point of contact in Alessandri's campaign.¹⁹⁵ CIA assistance to private businesses in Chile set the stage for future collaboration.

After the election, the CIA attempted the organizational appropriation of the Chilean military in Track II of the anti-Allende campaign. In October 1970, the CIA developed twenty-one contacts with key military and *carabinero* (police) officials to inquire into a potential military coup against Allende before the congressional plurality vote and swearing in of the new president in November. Those military and police officials who were inclined to stage a coup were given the assurance of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. government, both before and after.¹⁹⁶ It was determined that for the coup to be implemented, General Rene Schneider would have to be removed as commander-in-chief of the Army. The CIA assisted in funding a kidnap attempt, using a DOD contact to pass weapons and money to indicated U.S. support. The kidnap attempt turned sour, resulting in General Schneider's death. Having failed to generate a military coup prior to the presidential confirmation, the CIA ended its Track II effort. The new "official" CIA focus was on intelligence collection into potential coupe plots.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 21.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 26.

¹⁹⁷ Kinzer, *Overthrow*, 182–184.

Before the successful coup of September 11, 1973, the CIA increased its relationships with private business and began passing money to assist in group mobilization for transgressive contention in the form of public demonstrations and union strikes, and contained contention in voter registration and get-out-the vote campaigns. In September 1972, the 40 Committee authorized \$24,000 of emergency support for a powerful business organization. In October, another \$100,000 was authorized to support three private-sector organizations in Chile.¹⁹⁸ After the March 1973 congressional election failed to achieve a two-thirds senatorial majority for the impeachment of Allende, the 40 Committee explored increasing its assistance to the private sector for protests and strikes.

In August 1973, the 40 Committee approved a proposal to grant \$1 million to opposition parties and private-sector groups. CIA documents indicate that none of these funds were passed to private organizations before the coup. However, shortly after the coup \$84,000 was expended for commitments made before the military coup.¹⁹⁹ During the three-month tucker strike before the military coup on September 11, the CIA passed an undetermined amount of money to assist the strikers. The sums never exceeded the \$25,000 threshold that required 40 Committee approvals.²⁰⁰

c. Opportunity and Threat

Following the 1970 election of Salvador Allende with 36.2% of the popular vote and Jorge Alessandri with 35.27% of the popular vote, the CIA began a Track I covert operation to manipulate the congressional plurality vote that would decide who would become president. Under Chilean law, in a close presidential election, in which there is no clear majority, congress decides who will be president. The political action portion of Track I was an attempt to bribe or manipulate key congressional officials to sway the confirmation vote. The CIA came up with an elaborate scheme that would vote in Jorge Alessandri were he would resign, resulting in a second election where Eduardo Frei could

¹⁹⁸ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 30.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 27.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 31.

legally run for a second term. The political action of Track I never materialized, as Frei was reluctant to go along with it and the CIA was unable to get support in the congress.

To support a military coup in the Track II anti-Allende campaign, the CIA had to create political opportunity. To do so, the CIA funded a kidnapping operation of General Schneider just before the congressional vote to confirm the new president. General Schneider, the commander-in-chief, was staunchly opposed to military obstruction of political affairs. The kidnapping attempt went south and General Schneider was assassinated. With Schneider gone, the mobilization potential for a military coup increased. However, the coup would not happen in the time frame the CIA was expecting, and the Track II operation was closed down in November 1970. The CIA still maintained a covert intelligence-collection relationship with coup conspirators, but did not officially influence future coup attempts.²⁰¹

From 1970–1973, more than half of the 40 Committee’s \$7 million in approved funds supported the main opposition political parties: the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the National Party (PN), and several socialist splinter groups from the Popular Unity (UP) coalition, in an attempt to forge a united opposition to the Popular Unity government.²⁰² CIA funds supported the opposition parties in three elections, municipal elections in 1971 and 1972, and the congressional election in March 1973. This money enabled the opposition parties to maintain an anti-government campaign throughout the Allende years and encouraged citizens to demonstrate their opposition views in a variety of ways, from voting to street protests, riots, and labor strikes.²⁰³

Other CIA efforts supported rightwing paramilitary groups, notably *Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland and Liberty) and the Rolando Matus Brigade. During the Track II period, \$38,500 was passed to the groups, by a third party, to help create tensions for a military coup. The groups received more funds through the Allende years to assist propaganda and demonstration efforts. *Patria y Libertad* claimed responsibility for an

²⁰¹ Church and Tower, “Covert Action in Chile,” 26.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 28.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 29.

abortive coup on June 29, and on July 17, the group claimed they would soon unleash a total armed offensive to overthrow the government.²⁰⁴ The group's activities took advantage of opportunities that existed and presented threats of a paramilitary offensive to overthrow the government.

d. Broad Social Change

Operation FUBELT began as adjunct to the Track I and Track II operations of 1970, but continued until the 1973 military coup. The FUBELT operation was the Department of State and the CIA's deliberate effort to destabilize Chile's economy, which would create broad social change that would affect the political-opportunities structure in government, providing opportunities for opposition groups such as the military to challenge the Allende government. The CIA used its relationships with private businesses and international corporations to limit the short-term credit offered to Chile's government and influenced privately owned U.S. parts suppliers to delay the shipment of repair parts for the transportation, copper, steel, electricity, and petroleum sectors.²⁰⁵ Through covert action with private industry and the overt action of the Department of State, the broad social-change process brought about the military coup of September 11, 1973.

3. Contentious Politics Evaluation Area

There were many opportunities during the Nixon administration to evaluate PW efforts both in contained and transgressive contention. In contained contention, there was the congressional election of 1969, the September 1970 presidential election, the October 1970 congressional plurality vote, the 1971 and 1972 municipal elections, and the 1973 congressional election. In transgressive contention, there was the failed coup attempt in 1970, CIA supported protests and labor strikes, the aborted paramilitary coup in June 1973, and the successful military coup on September 11, 1973.

²⁰⁴ Church and Tower, "Covert Action in Chile," 31.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 32.

In preparing for the Allende presidency the Nixon administration adapted its PW effort to enact broad social change through economic and financial manipulation, using overt and covert measures. The administration continued covert efforts to alter Chile's social construct by calling for the end to the Allende government, pointing out the failures of Marxism, encouraging a military coup, and promoting a new military government. It also influenced the political opportunity structure by providing direct and indirect financial support of opposition political parties and used social appropriation though covert, direct and indirect financial support to private organizations. The Nixon administration continued to socially appropriate the Chilean military through overt military aid and training and covert contacts within the security organization to inspire a coup.

In the 1973 congressional election, the Nixon administration covertly supported the Allende opposition parties to gain enough seats in the senate to call for Allende's impeachment. The administration also covertly supported protests and a three-month truckers' strike that would lead to a military coup. Using PW, the Nixon administration eventually achieved its objective by overthrowing the Allende government and replacing it with a military government the United States could influence. Figures 11, 12, and 13 model relationships within the Chilean polity in 1964, 1970, and 1973, respectively. The next section uses the polity model to analyze U.S. political warfare in the presidential elections of 1964 and 1970 and the congressional election of 1973.

E. CHILEAN POLITY MODELS: AN ANALYSIS

The Chilean polity models illustrate a complex environment of changing alliances, party splits, and evolving support networks. The models also show how the U.S. government changed its PW strategy from 1961–1973, revealing covert and overt support that changed with each election or contentious episode. This section analyzes the models to identify significant changes between the major episodes.

1. 1964

The 1964 Chilean polity model in Figure 11 illustrates the Kennedy administration's successful approach to political warfare in the Chilean 1964 presidential election. Three key areas in the 1964 polity model of covert, overt, direct, and indirect methods merit discussion. The first area is the direct, covert support given by the CIA to party leaders within the polity. In providing direct support to these leaders, the United States gained influence over their actions, which directly affected governmental decisions. In 1964, the Radical Party had three different ideological groups in its ranks—some supporting the communists, some the moderates, and some the socialists. To bring the party closer to the Christian Democrats (PDC), the United States directly supported selected party leaders to strengthen support for the PDC over the Socialist Party or Communist Party. The same tactic was done with the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party.

The second area of note is the indirect, covert and overt relationship with non-polity members in the Catholic Church and women and mothers' clubs. Providing both covert and overt support to the Catholic Church helped the PDC organize its base of support and mobilize voters for election day. Providing support to the women and mother's clubs attracted the female vote to the PDC. In Chile, women were very vocal on political issues, organizing protests and demonstrations against policies they opposed. Through U.S. influence and propaganda, women's organizations became important allies in voter mobilization and influencing the social construct.

The final area of focus in the model is American overt, direct support of the Chilean military. In 1964, Chile's military was an apolitical organization. Through U.S. influence, members became indoctrinated into supporting Chile's constitution over political organizations. However, during the Cold War, the United States used its influence in the military to create hatred for Marxist ideology. The United States also indoctrinated the military, through training, to fear a communist revolution. Through overt training, equipment, and financial support, the United States gained a key polity ally that could be mobilized to support U.S. interests if political manipulation failed.




Figure 11. Model of Chilean Polity, 1964²⁰⁶

²⁰⁶ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*. Modified the Tilly polity model for political warfare distinguishing the types of coalitions overt/covert, covert, and overt.

2. 1970

The Chilean polity model in 1970 Figure 12 illustrates the Johnson and Nixon administrations' unsuccessful approaches to political warfare. The three areas of note in this model are the changes in the relationships among political actors, the lack of U.S. direct support to key political parties in the polity, and the introduction of private business into U.S. covert political warfare.

From 1964–1970, the political actors had changed. New political parties were introduced from the fracturing of the Socialist Party and some parties disappeared after merging into a moderate party. The Socialist Party (PS) fractured into three separate factions: the PS, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and the Socialist Democratic Party (PSD). The 1964 Liberal Party (PL) and Conservative Party (PCT) consolidated into a new National Party (PN) and the Democratic Party was absorbed into the National Democratic Party or leftwing groups within the Radical Party (PR). With this splintering and consolidation, U.S. political warfare actors should have been aware that the Christian Democrats were losing support and the National Party was rising as a potential ally. Nevertheless, the 40 Committee chose to focus on propaganda, giving only direct, covert support to the Radical Party to prevent it from splitting.

Indirectly, the United States continued to support the women's clubs for propaganda dissemination, not for organizing voter support behind a single candidate. International businesses recognized the National Party as the only group with a chance of preventing Allende from being elected. The 40 Committee chose not to take businessmen's offers of financial support, but instead directed them to individuals who could pass the funds. By sending businessmen to a figure in the National Party, the 40 Committee indirectly used a third party to achieve a political warfare objective.

After the election revealed an Allende victory, the United States attempted direct, covert methods. Track I lobbied important political figures within the polity, but not having given political parties direct support during the campaign, the United States was not well received. Track II was the United States' activation of its insurance policy in the Chilean military. The Track II operation contributed to the unplanned assassination of a

leader in the Chilean military, however, and action triggered feelings of national solidarity, putting an end to the U.S. Track II covert effort.




Figure 12. Model of Chilean Polity, 1970²⁰⁷

²⁰⁷ Ibid. Modified the Tilly polity model for political warfare distinguishing the types of coalitions as overt/covert, covert, and overt.

3. 1973

The 1973 polity model in Figure 13 reflects Nixon's approach to political warfare. The administration manipulated the 1973 congressional election to gain a political majority for impeaching Allende. The model reveals international businesses as an integral player in U.S. political warfare. It also highlights the development of new political parties on the left and the right, each taking voter support away from the two conglomerates.

Leading up to the election, the United States directly and indirectly funded all the parties and their support organizations to gain a congressional majority in the new Democratic Federation. To accomplish this maneuver, the United States splintered the Radical Party into three factions by providing direct, covert support to key leaders. The original Radical Party went with the Popular Unity coalition, while the Radical Democrats and the Radical Left chose the Democratic Federation, supported by the United States. The Popular Unity party also fractured supporters from the Christian Democrats (PDC) and the National Democrats (DN). Popular Unity created three new parties: the Christian Left (IC), the Unity Action Movement (MAPU), and the Independent Popular Action (API). The Popular Unity coalition maintained its majority in the 1973 congressional election, leaving the United States to rely on Chile's military as the backup means of political warfare.

To prepare for a military coup, the United States strengthened its relationship with the military covertly and overtly. Covertly, the CIA and the DOD maintained relationships with military leaders willing to act. Overtly, the United States increased military aid and training, providing the resources and leadership training necessary to implement a coup and run a government. Additionally, the CIA strengthened its relationships in private business by providing covert funds to assist the trucker's strike.

Used as a tool to examine political warfare, the polity models help define a political setting and identify key players by their access to government. Once the key players are plotted, the polity model becomes a targeting and evaluation tool to develop and analyze PW strategies.




Figure 13. Model of Chilean Polity, 1973²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ Ibid. Modified the Tilly polity model for political warfare distinguishing the type of coalition as overt/covert, covert, and overt.

F. ANALYSIS OF AGENCY TABLES

1. Department of State

The Department of State data in Table 5 shows the social construct and broad social-change processes as the two main areas in which Department of State PW actions influenced the political dynamic in Chile. It also reveals that the Department of State tended to conduct overt, direct and indirect actions with a few covert, direct actions under the Kennedy and Nixon administrations. Analysis of the table reveals that most Department of State actions took place under Kennedy and declined under Johnson, with the exception of Alliance for Progress economic aid started by Kennedy. The Nixon administration chose not to overtly address Chilean politics. Nixon's covert/overt, indirect approach to broad social change was the opposite of Kennedy overt, direct approach. It could be argued that Nixon's approach to broad social change processes had a greater effect at creating social change than Kennedy's approach.

Table 5. Department of State Actions in Chile, 1961–1973

<u>Department of State Political Warfare Actions in Chile 1961–1973</u>	Broad Social Change Processes	Attribution of Political Opportunity or Threat	Social Construct	Social/Organizational Appropriation
Overt-Direct	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alliance for progress foreign aid \$420 million from 1961–64 • \$680 million from 65–69 • Economic aid decreased sharply in 1970 \$29 mil • 1971 economic aid to \$8.6 mil • 1973 economic aid to \$3.8 mil 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kennedy Inaugural Address January 61 Alliance for Progress • March 13 1961 White House announces Alliance for progress prospects • Kennedy Presidential Receptions for Latin American diplomats • August '61 Alliance for Progress official charter • Johnson indorses Frei presidency and praise • Not increasing Alliance for Progress funds • Nixon announces end of the Alliance for Progress • Nixon's new program Action for Progress • Nixon public statement are open to Chilean people 	
Covert-Indirect			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USIA printed poster, leaflets, magazines, books and conducted mail campaigns using third parties to distribute • Nixon would use influence in international financial institutions to limit Chiles ability to pay its bills or get funding to run the country 	
Overt-Indirect			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pope letter to Chile • Nixon administration influences Inter-American Development bank, World Bank, and other international financial institutions to limit Chile loans 	

2. Central Intelligence Agency

The CIA Table 6 shows direct and indirect covert action affecting all the manipulation fields in Chile's political environment. Comparing the three tables, the CIA played a dominant political warfare role, focusing most of its efforts on the social construct with secondary efforts in the political-opportunity structure and social or organizational appropriation. The CIA also conducted broad social-change actions to create environmental instability assisted by Department of State cuts in economic aid and decreased DOD military aid. Analysis reveals that CIA actions peaked in 1964 and 1973 and declined between 1964 and 1969. During the Johnson administration, there were many opportunities to prepare for the 1970 presidential election against Allende. The Johnson and early Nixon administration's lack of effort in Chilean political warfare caused Nixon to be reactive to Chilean political events. Both administrations' lack of PW planning and action caused the Nixon administration to implement drastic and impulsive political warfare measures without fully considering the long-term consequences. The aggressive reactionary covert PW strategies of the Nixon administration led to the over exposure of U.S. involvement in undermining the democratic institutions of foreign countries and the connection between oppressive military governments supported by the United States.

Table 6. CIA Actions in Chile, 1961–1973

<u>Central Intelligence Agency Political Warfare Actions in Chile 1961–1973</u>	Broad Social Change Processes	Attribution of Political Opportunity or Threat	Social Construct	Social/Organizational Appropriation
Overt Direct				
Covert-Direct		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1963 Funding of the Radical Party Democratic Front coalition • Infiltrated the PCCH & PS, tried to split PS • Funding of DC • Influence Radical party leaders to not indorse Allende • Influence key PS leaders in FRAP coalition • \$30,000 spent on right wing Radical party 67 • Track I manipulate the congressional vote for Allende presidency confirmation • Fund conservative and liberals to support Frei • Track II military coup 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Black propaganda to break FRAP in 1964 and 1969 • Black propaganda used in to break PS and PCCH coalition • Black propaganda used for Chile security services and military showing Allende connection with Cuba and intent to jail military and security leaders • Black propaganda used to splinter communist labor unions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funding Christian Democrats • Track II military coup • Funding of paramilitary organizations Fatherland of Liberty & Rolando Matus Brigade
Covert-Indirect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIA influence in international business caused a complete shut down of essential repair parts in all sectors of Chile's economy. • Used influence in international business to limit short term credit to Chile government and utilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1962 funding of the Christian Democrats • Funding private groups to break up FRAP • Moderate party funding in \$175,000 in 1965 and \$350,000 in 1969 electoral races • 1970-73 \$7mil spent on opposition groups in Chile • Assassination of General Schneider 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funded propaganda against communism, films, direct mail poster, leaflets, radio, news media • Replayed article from abroad, Pope letter disseminated • @\$2 mil in Ant-communist prop 65–69 • Use influence with Latin American countries to call the dangers if Allende is president • CIA calls upon covert international media Assets to cover Chile's story after loosing most of the propaganda assets after Allende election 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1962 Funding of the Christian Democrats • 1964 supplementing half of Frei campaign • 1964 funded private citizen groups, voter registration, and descendent socialist • Funding community orgs stopped in 67 because CIA funding was exposed • Women's group funding • Funded Organized Democratic labor unions • Passed money to private business to mobilize labor strikes and protest • Funded the trucker strike
Overt Indirect				

3. Department of Defense

Department of Defense actions in Chile Table 7 focused on three manipulation fields: the attribution of threat and opportunity, the social construct, and organizational appropriation. DOD actions were overt, direct and covert, indirect. The overt, direct actions influenced the fields of opportunity and threat, the social construct, and organizational appropriation. Covert, indirect actions affected the opportunity and threat fields with organizational appropriation. The political warfare effort in Chile would not have been achieved without a long-standing DOD overt effort to socially appropriate Chile's military leaders.

Table 7. Department of Defense Actions in Chile, 1961–1973

<u>Department of Defense Political Warfare Actions in Chile 1961–1973</u>	Broad Social Change Processes	Attribution of Political Opportunity or Threat	Social Construct	Social/Organizational Appropriation
Overt Direct		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nixon administration decreases military aid from \$11 million in '69 to \$800,000 in '70 to try and induce a Chilean military coupe of Allende 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DOD training conditioned the Chilean military to be heavily anti communist 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DOD military aid \$57.2 million 61–64 DOD foreign military training in Panama. Training over 4500 Chilean military from 1950 thru 1969 \$54 million military aid training 400 personnel 64–69 Mil aid decreased to \$800,000 in 1970 Military training would increase to 200 per year from 1973–1975
Covert-Direct				
Covert-Indirect		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Track II the CIA would use DOD to identify key Chile military leaders that would be willing to conduct a coup DOD would use provide assurance the U.S. would support a coup action DOD threatened to cut off Aid if Allende was elected 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Track II DOD used military aid as a means to appropriate the Chilean military for a coup
Overt Indirect				

G. CONCLUSION

The Chile case is an interesting PW study because it illustrates changing PW strategies with each U.S. president. It also shows the successes and failures of U.S. political warfare strategy over a twelve-year period. Comparing the agency tables with the changing polity models reveals the PW strategy as it changes with each president. Over the three presidencies each agency was used in a slightly different manor.

Under the Kennedy administration there was a whole of government overt effort to affect Chilean politics. Kennedy's PW effort in Chile followed the template established in Italy from 1946 to 1948 with one exception; no overt non-communist government stipulations placed on U.S. aid. The lack of effort placed on affecting the social construct in promoting U.S. economic aid with stipulations limiting the communist influence in Chile's government, limited the effectiveness of creating broad social change processes to favor U.S. interests. Kennedy's balanced PW approach used covert measure to reinforce the overt effort in Chile's 1964 presidential election.

The Johnson administrations PW effort was not balanced. Economic and military aid increased through Johnson's presidency but the DOS and CIA efforts to influence Chilean politics through the social construct or opportunity and threat were mismatched with the effort to create broad social change. The mismatch caused the PW strategy to fail to keep Chile's Communist and Socialist Party from controlling government in 1970.

The Nixon administration PW effort highlights an effective strategy from 1971–1973 with an initial failure in the 1970 presidential election. The Nixon administration failed to recognize the changing political situation leading to the Chile's 1970 election. There was no effort to support a specific political party for president in opposition to Allende. The political warfare effort focused almost completely on the social construct through covert, indirect and covert, direct methods. By failing in efforts to mobilize voter support for an opposition party to the Popular Unity coalition prior to the election, the Nixon administration resorted to drastic measures in Track I and Track II efforts. Both PW efforts failed to achieve the objective in the timeframe expected.

The Nixon administration's PW effort from 1971–1973 was a whole of government approach. Department of State and DOD efforts complemented the CIA's covert strategy. The PW effort to manipulate contained contention within Chile failed to achieve the desired results in the 1973 congressional election. Having failed in contained contention, the PW effort shifted to transgressive contention by supporting the Chilean military in an Allende government coup. Ultimately the U.S. political objective was achieved through DOD's overt and covert direct efforts to appropriate the Chilean military. DOD's use of overt military aid and training enable the covert PW strategy.

VI. CONCLUSION: POLITICAL WARFARE— A MILITARY IMPERATIVE

The purpose of this thesis was to identify DOD's contribution to political warfare during the Cold War to help identify areas for increased Department of Defense involvement in the planning, development, and practice of political warfare in today's environment. Three research questions were proposed.

- (1) How does DOD involvement in political warfare strategy and practice affect U.S. PW objectives?

The case studies show the Department of Defense involvement in political warfare strategy and practice affects U.S. PW objectives by supporting Department of State and CIA political warfare efforts. DOD efforts tend to reinforce the security apparatus of the political entities supported by other agencies. Using resources and training assistance, DOD PW efforts increase the political opposition's perception of threat, which decreases their collective action mobilization potential. In the event political action fails to achieve the intended objective, DOD's political warfare efforts provide each agency a secondary course of action to achieve the intended objective. DOD efforts to appropriate the security apparatus in favor of U.S. objectives assures that military and security leaders become political allies in the event of a coup or overthrow of the political system. In overt and covert action, the DOD's primary PW role is to provide the resources and training in the mobilization processes of social or organizational appropriation. DOD's primary role is followed by secondary efforts aimed at influencing the opportunity and threat field of the CPM model.

DOD actions can support political warfare objectives in a number of ways. In the Italy case the Department of Defense was instrumental in establishing a new Italian government. DOD was able to appoint political leaders of its choosing, assist in the drafting of a new constitution and government, as well as provide resources and training to the security apparatus to support and enforce the new system. Prior to transferring control of government, DOD's political warfare strategy was focused on removing the fascist party and winning the war against Germany. DOD could have set the political

conditions to favor U.S. influence by limiting the political power of the Communist and Socialist Parties during DOD's control of the transitional government. Had there been political warfare training within DOD, military officers could have recognized the political atmosphere and foreseen a future political threat within the parties of the CLN.

In the Chilean case, DOD played an enabling role to the political warfare strategy of the other U.S. agencies. DOD's support and social appropriation of Chile's military provided the opportunity for the CIA to influence the overthrow of the Allende government. DOD was used as an overt tool of political warfare that easily transitioned to the covert manipulation of military leaders. DOD's versatility and perceived benign connection to political warfare make it an ideal source for use in political warfare strategy.

- (2) How can expanding the DOD's role in political warfare increase the available policy options for today's decision makers?

DOD is a distinctive agency in its ability to easily operate in overt and covert political warfare spheres. This dual capability strongly supports a greater role for the Department of Defense in PW strategy development and practice. Expanding the DOD's role in political warfare increases the available policy options for today's decision makers. In today's environment, DOD is used to break an established political system and then used to rebuild the system according to perceived democratic principles as seen most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD's understanding of political warfare and the processes involved in broad social change, political opportunity and threat, the social construct, and mobilization within organizational and social appropriation will help military planners rebuild a political system to favor U.S. interests. However, the political environment of the target must first be understood and a political warfare plan must be in place prior to DOD involvement in breaking the system. Understanding a political environment and the political warfare plan will help DOD shape the political environment during the breakdown and rebuild process.

- (3) What are some ways the DOD can support political warfare and its objectives?

Increasing DOD involvement in the development of political warfare policy would require that military leaders understand and study the disciplines of political warfare, both overt and covert. Educating military officers in political warfare strategy and methods will equip them to advise policymakers on alternative courses of action, especially when military coercion is deemed inappropriate to a political objective. The Department of Defense should develop a PW military specialist that understands the range of actions available and when to implement them in a political environment. The specialist would provide an informed political perspective to conventional commanders, supporting effective, multidimensional military strategies towards a strategic objective. Politically informed military leaders can shape a target's political environment during conventional wars to better prepare for the transition to political warfare strategies. The active engagement of the Department of Defense in the development of political warfare strategy enables military leaders to fully grasp the political objectives. The increased understanding gained from developing these strategies ensures that military strategies in the conduct of war correspond with political intent and that military strategies short of war prevent political warfare from escalating to conventional war.

- (4) Political Warfare and the Contentious Politics Mobilization Model

This study identified the contentious politics mobilization model's utility in describing, developing, and planning political warfare strategy. It also proposed using the polity model and the political warfare spectrum as tools to evaluate the political space and determine the ways political warfare actions could be conducted. The ability to influence group collective action was determined to be the primary way to achieve a political warfare objective. The processes that influence collective action were identified in the contentious politics mobilization (CPM) model as broad social change processes, political opportunities and threats, the social construct, and social or organizational appropriation. The adapted CPM model also provides an area for evaluation and outcome prediction that was used in the case studies to evaluate the effectiveness of a PW strategy. The use of the models together provides a starting point for DOD's development of a

political warfare methodology that uses social movement theory models as the foundational framework. The application of the models proved to be effective in describing U.S. political warfare conducted in democratic forms of government. Future thesis research should evaluate the models application to PW in other forms of government, tribal systems, and un-governed societies.

APPENDIX A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES

This study selected McAdam's political-process model as a key element in studying group collective action processes for use in political warfare. This selection was based on the political-process model's broad integration of different levels of social analysis and its use of structural and social-constructivist study approaches. Social movement theories can be organized according to three levels of analysis: the micro, meso, and macro. Stephen Engel describes the micro level as focused on the individual. Micro-level social movement theories provide explanations as to why people participate in social movements. The meso level focuses on the group or organization by explaining how social movements gain the resources to participate in collective action. The macro-level analysis provides external and institutional explanations influencing collective action, indicating when a group or individual can participate in social movements.²⁰⁹

To visualize where the predominant social movement theories fit, Stephen Engel developed a graphical construct to differentiate the various social movement theories by their level of analysis and approach, as seen in Figure 14.²¹⁰ Figure 14 indicates the political-process model as the only social movement theory that incorporates all three analytical levels, and therefore provides the most inclusive explanation of collective action.

Besides incorporating all three levels of analysis, the political-process model includes both structural and constructivist approaches. Generally speaking, social movement scholars focus either on structural or social constructivist approaches. The structural approach tries to explain social movements through external and internal environmental processes.²¹¹ Structural approaches "focus on the distribution of material

²⁰⁹ Engel, *The Unfinished Revolution*, 14.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Jacquelin Van Stekelenburg and Bert Klandermans, "Social Movement Theory: Past, Present and Prospects" In *Movers and Shakers: Social Movements in Africa*, ed. Stephen Ellis and Ineke van Kessel, African Dynamics 8 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009), 18, <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/18530/ASC-075287668-1735-01.pdf?sequence=2>.

resources and the organization or institutions that govern such distribution.”²¹² The social-constructivist perspective concentrates on how individuals and groups perceive and interpret conditions within their environment. Constructivists focus on the cognitive, psychological, cultural, and affective aspects that lead to political contention.²¹³ McAdam’s political-process model provides the most inclusive framework for understanding the collective action processes of a social movement by providing both structural and constructivist perspectives.




Figure 14. Social Movement Theory Organization²¹⁴

B. THE POLITICAL-PROCESS MODEL

McAdam identifies three key processes necessary for social movement development by looking at the internal characteristics inherent to the movement’s preparation for collective action. The basic processes involved in the political-process

²¹² Jackie Smith and Tina Fetner in *Handbook of Social Movements across Disciplines*, Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research (New York: Springer, 2010), 13.

²¹³ Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, *Movers and Shakers*, 18–19.

²¹⁴ Stephen M. Engel, *The Unfinished Revolution: Social Movement Theory and the Gay and Lesbian Movement*, Cambridge Cultural Social Studies (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

model provide the intellectual foundation from which McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow develop the Contentious politics mobilization model. The CPM model expands the collective action explanations of McAdam's political-process model by incorporating them into a dynamic political setting of competing organizations. The CPM model is the lens this study uses to evaluate PW actions by where and how they influence a target's political setting. Understanding the foundational characteristics presented in the political-process model provides insights into the dynamic interactions involved in the CPM model.

The political-process model is important to a political warfare actor because it identifies the essential components and processes for group collective action. An actor's understanding of the internal characteristics of a social movement helps him identify the areas that can be manipulate to assist or suppress group collective action. An understanding of the underlying processes allows the actor to develop strategies using a social movement and collective action as the means to a political warfare objective.

Social movement experts Van Stekelenburg and Klanderm provide a useful description of how the political process model is interpreted:

In general, the political process approach argues that the ebb and flow of movement activity is related to the opening up and closure of political opportunities. Protesters are rational, instrumental, polity-oriented people who seize opportunities by lobbying and forming coalitions with political elites. Cognitive liberation proposes that the subjectivity of actors makes resources usable and collective action viable. It helps actors and groups frame their situation as unjust and liable to change.²¹⁵

The political-process model has three critical, interrelated fields of enquiry necessary for the successful development of a social movement.²¹⁶ The first area is changing opportunity structure, which McAdam developed from an understanding of the political opportunity-structure theory first proposed by Peter Eisinger in the macro-level

²¹⁵ Van Stekelenburg and Klanderm, *Movers and Shakers*, 28.

²¹⁶ Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 2nd ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 40.

analysis.²¹⁷ The second field is pre-existing organizational strength, based on McAdam's understanding of McCarthy and Zald's resource-mobilization theory in meso-level analysis.²¹⁸ The final component is the psychological process of cognitive liberation, a concept developed by McAdam that incorporates processes from rational-choice theory and the classical approach in the micro-level analysis. McAdam's combination of micro, meso, and macro analysis provides a comprehensive theoretical explanation for how, when, and why social movement organizations emerge.

The political-process model has become the predominant method for studying and analyzing the emergence of a social movement. The next section explains how McAdam's political process model is interpreted by expounding upon the component processes that distinguish the model. Understanding the processes behind the political-process model simplifies the dynamic explanation of the CPM model used in the case study.

1. Broad Socioeconomic Processes

McAdam illustrates the workings of the political process model through the four processes shown in Figure 15.

²¹⁷ Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," *American Political Science Review* 67, no. 1 (March 1973): 11, doi:10.2307/1958525.

²¹⁸ John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 6 (May 1, 1977): 1212–41, doi:10.2307/2777934.




Figure 15. McAdam's Political-Process Model²¹⁹

At the left of the Figure 15 are broad socioeconomic processes—any social or economic influence over an extended period of time that has a broad impact within a political setting. The arrow pointing up from broad socioeconomic processes illustrates the effect they have on strengthening or weakening a political system. The strength or weakness of the political system can either create or close opportunities for opposition groups to influence the political establishment. An example of the process is how a strong economy can strengthen the political system by providing the resources necessary to suppress an opposition group. Conversely, weak economies lead to fewer resources on which a government can rely. The inability to suppress an opposition creates or expands the opportunities for an opposition group to influence the political situation.

Another example of broad socioeconomic processes is the psychological effect international perception has on a political establishment. The perceptions of the international arena are broad social processes that can influence the actions of an established political entity. This influence then limits the available actions a political body can take, which could create opportunities for an opposition group to challenge the government.

²¹⁹ Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, 2nd ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). Modified adding illustration of structural potential, mobilizing structures and framing process.

The lower arrow of Figure 15, pointing from broad socioeconomic processes, indicates the effect of broad social processes on organizational strength. Broad social processes like migration or overpopulation provide an increase in the human-resource base from which mobilization can occur. Broad socioeconomic processes, such as the type of economy an area is reliant upon or the cultural diversity of a given system, affect the type and strength of the organizational structures that are available for group mobilization and collective action. For example, the presence of trade unions in an industrial society provides organizational structures or networks that lower the barriers for implementing collective action; in tribal societies, these structures exist along tribal lines or coalitions.

The effects that socioeconomic process have on expanding political opportunities or threats and indigenous organizational strength, increases or decreases the potential for a social movement to emerge. Structural potential is indicated by the up– down arrow at the center of Figure 15. McAdam describes structural potential as a group’s realization and evaluation of opportunities and threats in their political environment. Indigenous organizational strength must be perceived as strong enough to overcome possible threats. Political opportunities must also be present for the insurgent or challenger organization, and this potential must be transformed into collective action by means of cognitive liberation.²²⁰ “All three factors (organizational strength, political opportunity, cognitive liberation) are regarded as necessary, but alone insufficient, to cause the emergence of a social insurgency.”²²¹ The following subsections explain the individual components that are unique to McAdam’s political-process model explanations for collective action in a social movement.

2. Political Opportunity and Threat

The second component of the political-process model in Figure 15 is political opportunities and threats, which occur within a defined political system and are a function of domestic capacity. Domestic capacity allows states to define their political

²²⁰ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 48–51.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 51.

interests and enforce decisions, thereby controlling potential protest.²²² Social movement experts Craig Jenkins and Bert Klanderman's, whose work focuses on political-opportunity structures, cite domestic capacity as the strength of a political system. Their work identifies four variables that contribute to the strength of domestic capacity:

1. Despotic control—the ability to maintain domestic order through repression
2. Infrastructure capacity—a state's ability to mobilize labor and financial resources
3. Administrative and rule-making capacity— associated with governmental structure, degree of administrative centralization, and civil-service professionalism
4. International support— supplementation of the three variables²²³

“These variables allow states to define political interest and to enforce decisions, thereby controlling protest.”²²⁴ Opportunities occur in the shifting relationships among variables: as state capacity decreases, opportunity for social movements increases.

To differentiate McAdam's concept of opportunities and threats in the political-process model from Eisner et al.'s political-opportunity structure theory, McAdam proposes that a state's capacity need not decrease for opportunities to occur. McAdam explains:

Regardless of whether the broad social processes serve to undermine the structural basis of the entire political system or simply to enhance the strategic position of a single challenger, the result is the same: a net increase in the political leverage exercised by insurgent groups. Increased political leverage improves the bargaining position of the insurgent group thus creating new opportunities for the collective pursuit of group goals. This improved bargaining position raises significantly the costs of repressing insurgent actions. The increase in political power of the insurgent group also encourages collective action by diminishing the risks associated with movement participation.²²⁵

²²² J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds., *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements*, Social Movements, Protest, and Contention, v. 3 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 24.

²²³ Ibid., 23.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 43.

McAdam expands the original concepts provided by political-opportunity structure theory by incorporating processes from rational-choice theory and resource-mobilization theory. The fusion of these concepts elevates the political-process model's collective action explanations over competing theories of social movement and collective action.

3. Organizational Strength

The third process in the Figure 15 model is insurgent organizational strength. The components that make up organizational strength are mobilization structures, cultural strength, communications networks, and leaders.²²⁶ The four variables contribute to a social movement's organizational strength, affecting its ability to mobilize.

a. Mobilization Structures

In McAdam's model, the mobilizing structure resides in the human networks of the indigenous organizations present in the political space. These organizational structures form the base from which two types of member recruitment occurs. The first type is at the micro level, through individual ties within existing indigenous organizations. The recruited individuals go on to form new social ties that result in the development of a new social movement organization. The second type of recruitment is at the meso level, through the bloc recruitment of an entire group or organization. The recruited groups or organizations form coalitions that result in the development of the new social movement organization.²²⁷

b. Cultural Strength

The second component in organizational strength is cultural strength, which is gained through solidarity incentives and the communication networks of members within the social movement. Solidarity incentives are those interpersonal rewards that provide

²²⁶ Bob Edwards and John McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization" In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, Blackwell Companions to Sociology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2004), 117, <http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/developpement/shared/developpement/cours/IA029/Snow-2004.pdf>.

²²⁷ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 44–45.

motive for participation in an established organization. The importance of these rewards helps explain why recruitment through established networks is so efficient.²²⁸ Solidarity incentives help resolve the free-rider problem associated with the rational-choice model. The free-rider problem in the rational choice model refers to an individual receiving the benefit of group collective action without having to pay any of the costs. If benefits can be received without any costs, there is no incentive to engage in collective action.

c. *Communications Networks*

The third component is communication networks, described as the inter-organizational linkages characteristic of established groups. These communication links disseminate an ideology throughout an aggrieved population, contributing to the emergence of a social movement.²²⁹ Cultural diffusion and adoption happens along the same communications networks and infrastructures. The strength and range of the network determines the pattern, speed, and extent of movement and expansion.²³⁰

d. *Leaders*

The final component in organizational strength is leadership. Social movement leaders provide centralized direction and coordination to help diffuse and actualize ideas into collective action. Leaders frame group situations and organize collective action by leveraging organizational strengths to exploit political opportunities. McAdam points out that the four variables of organizational strength are interrelated. “The established organizations within the movement’s mass base insure the presence of recognized leaders who can be called upon to lend their prestige and organizing skills to the incipient movement.”²³¹ A leader’s ability to frame a group’s situation as unjust and subject to change contributes to the final process in the political-process model: cognitive liberation.

²²⁸ Ibid., 45.

²²⁹ I McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 47.

²³⁰ Ibid., 46.

²³¹ Ibid., 48.

4. Cognitive Liberation

Cognitive liberation in Figure 15 is a subjective process that takes place within the minds of a given population. McAdam believes a social movement's emergence depends on whether an aggrieved group recognizes and collectively defines its situation as unjust and susceptible to change through group action. The likelihood that cognitive liberation will occur depends on whether existing political opportunities can trigger the process by supplying the necessary cognitive cues to individuals within an organization.²³²

McAdam describes cognitive cues as shifts in the interpretation of existing conditions, as perceived by members and challengers. When cognitive cues are interpreted in favor of a challenger, members within the polity will display an increase in symbolic responsiveness to insurgent or challenger actions. This increase in responsiveness by polity members indicates an increase in insurgent bargaining power and exposes potential vulnerabilities within the political structure. The likelihood that cognitive cues trigger cognitive liberation is directly related to the strength of the integrative ties within a movement's mass base.²³³ In other words, the greater the solidarity of a group, the greater the likelihood it will be cognizant of the signals that exist within the social construct. This awareness will then increase the likelihood that a group will accept, recognize, and engage in collective action as a means of political or social change.

Frances Piven and Richard Cloward describe three attributes associated with group consciousness and cognitive liberation. The political system or aspects of the system must first lose legitimacy. Populations that ordinarily accept a state's authority and the legitimacy of institutional arrangements must come to believe they are unjust and wrong. The second attribute of cognitive liberation is when people who ordinarily believe that the existing arrangements are inevitable begin to assert rights and demand change.

²³² McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 48–49.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 48–50.

The final attribute is when people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless come to believe they are capable of changing their situation.²³⁴

A new field of study called the “framing process” advances the study of cognitive liberation by explaining the rhetorical processes groups use to define their situation, create a social identity, provide solutions, and produce group action. Snow and Benford are the leading scholars on framing social movements. Their research identifies three framing tasks. The first is the diagnostic frame, focusing on problem identification and attribution. The second is the prognostic frame, which identifies a clear solution and a means for implementation. The third is the motivational frame, which inspires people to act.²³⁵ McAdam’s cognitive liberation focuses on the individual sense of empowerment prior to involvement. The framing processes emphasizes the more strategic decisions achieved at a higher organizational level as an ongoing dynamic process. At minimum, a group needs to describe its grievances persuasively in the diagnostic frame and present a feasible solution within the prognostic frame.²³⁶ A movement or organization then enacts the feasible suggestions of the prognostic frame by engaging in collective action. The type of collective action a movement or group uses is a product of a group’s repertoire of contention.

5. Collective Action

Collective action in the political-process model is the culmination of a social movement’s development, political opportunities and threats, group organizational strength, and cognitive liberation. McAdam observes that when a social movement engages in collective action, it uses the tactics available for insurgent communication. The social movement’s tactics vary by the degree to which their actions threaten other

²³⁴ Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Vintage books, 1979), 3–4,
[https://libcom.org/files/\[Frances_Fox_Piven,_Richard_Cloward\]_Poor_People’s\(bookos.org\)\(1\).pdf](https://libcom.org/files/[Frances_Fox_Piven,_Richard_Cloward]_Poor_People’s(bookos.org)(1).pdf).

²³⁵ Robert Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 2000, 615.

²³⁶ Neal Caren, “Political Process Theory” In *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, ed. George Ritzer (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2007), 3456,
http://philosociology.com/UPLOADS/_PHILOSOCIOLOGY.ir_Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology_George Ritzer.pdf.

organized groups in the political environment.²³⁷ Tactics can pursue either institutionalized or non-institutionalized mechanisms for conflict resolution. In the political-process model, McAdam focuses on a social movement's use of non-institutionalized, collective action tactics, believing that they challenge elite power groups by rejecting the established, institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution—thus depriving elites of their dominant institutional power.²³⁸

The variables contributing to McAdam's political-process model—broad social-change processes, political opportunities and threats, cognitive liberation, framing, and group collective action—are each essential in achieving political change. The Contentious politics mobilization model understands the political environment as comprising many social movement organizations, with actors inside and outside of the government. These organizations and actors are competing or collaborating with each other, either to maintain the status quo or seek political change.

The CPM model adapts two of McAdam's political-process models, one for the challenger and one for the member, and places them in a dynamic, interactive political environment of competition. The resulting interaction resolves the more static single-actor explanations provided by the original political-process model and broadens the field of study to incorporate dynamic process for multiple types of contention.²³⁹ The new construct recognizes that all types of politics operate through similar interactive processes between member, challengers, and subjects.²⁴⁰

²³⁷ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 57.

²³⁸ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*,

²³⁹ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 50.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

APPENDIX B. PROMINENT ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 1946–1948 ELECTIONS

1. The Italian Socialist Party (PSI)

The Italian Socialist Party of the late 1940's was a party of two ideologies: half believed in the revolutionary struggle of the middle class and half believed in gradual social change realized within the framework of a parliamentary system.²⁴¹ Originally formed in 1892, the Socialist Party came to be one of the largest political parties in Italy by 1919, splitting in 1921 to form two separate parties, the PCI and the PSI. Mussolini, fearing a socialist revolution, eliminated the PSI and PCI from government in 1926. In exile, the PSI and PCI formed a Unity of Action Pact that vowed to undermine Fascism.

When the Spanish civil war broke out in 1936, and Mussolini sent Italian troops to help Franco, the Italian Socialist and Communists joined the Spanish Republic fighting together in the International Brigades. Their wartime experience and collaboration against fascism cemented the relationship between the two parties.²⁴²

Leaders from the PSI and PCI participated in the Spanish civil war, gaining valuable war-fighting experience, support, and legitimacy, which would later prove invaluable in the WWII partisan resistance in northern Italy seven years later. The PSI organized its supporters through trade unions of the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) and the Italian Labor Union (UIL).²⁴³ The PSI was able to use existing organizational structures within the union as a base for political support. This gave the political party the structural tools needed to organize and mobilize resources for political purposes.

2. The Italian Communist Party (PCI)

The Italian Communist Party, with the support of the Soviet Union, was the only party able to maintain a limited underground organization in Italy during the fascist

²⁴¹ Mammarella, *Italy After Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965*, 42.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 46.

²⁴³ Sassoon, *Contemporary Italy*, 43.

regime.²⁴⁴ Before the armistice agreement, the PCI capitalized on its underground networks within the Italian Confederation of Labor (CGIL) trade unions to instigate factory strikes in Milan and Turin during March and April of 1943. These orchestrated, open revolts were the first mass protests against Italian fascism since its inception. The overt strikes and the absence of oppression from the government signaled its declining power over the Italian population.²⁴⁵ The existing underground networks of the PCI, coupled with their revolutionary ideology, military experience, and financial support from the Soviet Union, enabled the party to become a prominent force within the partisan resistance of northern Italy.²⁴⁶ The PCI's continuous presence within Italy allowed them to capitalize on changing events, giving them the early advantage in organizing a strong base of support within the trade unions of northern, central, and southern Italy. After northern Italy was liberated in 1945, the PCI had over two million active members.²⁴⁷ The PCI, having been introduced by the United States into powerful positions within the newly established Italian government, became dominant within the coalition and began shaping, as well as undermining, the evolving Italian political system for its own advantage.

3. Christian Democrats

The Christian Democrats (DC) began in 1943, with members that were remnants of the Populist Party outlawed in 1926. The Catholic Church in Rome was the original supporter of the Populist Party, and subsequently the Christian Democrats. The Vatican, fearing that socialism and communism would gain increasing political ground after fascism, established a political force that Italian Catholics could rally behind in opposition to the revolutionary and antireligious movements of competing parties.²⁴⁸ Unfortunately, almost none of the political support structure of the Populist Party

²⁴⁴ Sassoon, *Contemporary Italy*, 6.

²⁴⁵ H. Stuart Hughes, *The United States and Italy*, 3d ed., enl, The American Foreign Policy Library (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979), 115.

²⁴⁶ Mammarella, *Italy after Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965*, 82.

²⁴⁷ Sassoon, *Contemporary Italy*, 6.

²⁴⁸ Mammarella, *Italy after Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965*, 56.

remained intact during the fascist dictatorship. As a result, the Christian Democrats lacked an established political machine at its formation, which left the DC weak as compared to the established political force of the PSI and PCI at the time.²⁴⁹

The DC would have to appropriate existing organizational structures within Italian society to reconstitute its organization, capitalizing on semi-political bodies associated with the Church.²⁵⁰ The most powerful Catholic organization was Catholic Action (CA), which consisted of six smaller social organizations sustained by the Catholic Church: the Italian Federation of Catholic Men (IFCM), the Ancient Society of Youth (ASY), the University Student Federation (FUCI), the Italian Feminist Organization (IFO), the Italian Catholic Young Women (GF), and the girls' branch of the FUCI (FUCIG). The parish council, diocesan committee, and central committee of the Italy Action Committee (ACI) coordinated the efforts of the various CA organizations.²⁵¹ Additionally, the Christian Democrats helped organize support by using the lower clergy at the parish level, in the form of civic committees.²⁵² Other organizations associated with the Catholic Church included trade unions such as the Christian Association of Italian Workers (ACLI), the Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions (CISL), and the *Coldiretti*, also known as the Federation of Italian Farmers (FIF).²⁵³ Using the Church as a launching pad, the Christian Democrats soon emerged as the most powerful of the parties in the CLN. The appropriation of existing structures within the Church allowed the Christian Democrats to organize a base of support and gain valuable resources for future political mobilization.

²⁴⁹ Mammarella, *Italy after Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965*, 56.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Gianfranco Poggi, *Catholic Action in Italy: The Sociology of a Sponsored Organization* (Stanford University Press, 1967), 23.

²⁵² Mammarella, *Italy After Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965*, 57.

²⁵³ Christopher Duggan and Christopher Wagstaff, eds., *Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture and Society 1948–58* (Oxford ; Washington, DC: Berg, 1995), 123.

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